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22 JAN 1940

by *McClave*  
M. C. HARVEY

LT COL., AC  
CUSTODIAN

XIX CORPS


DEMONSTRATION

2nd ARMORED DIVISION

TANK-INFANTRY ASSAULT OF TACTICAL LOCALITY

30th INFANTRY DIVISION

INFANTRY ASSAULT OF FORTIFIED VILLAGE



RECORDED RECORDS OF PERSONNEL

FILE #

Spurzem B. W. Wellerberger  
A/C 1st ODC Instructor  
Tuguska Section 7 Jan 45

McBain 6 Jan 45

Conner 9 Jan 45

McBain 7 May 45

Wilson

Ward

Ward 2 May 45

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 270

15 December 1944

SUBJECT: Training Material.

TO : Commanding General, Command & General Staff School  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1. Inclosed herewith is the program for two training demonstrations conducted by units of this Corps in compliance with instructions Commanding General, Ninth U.S. Army for certain officers of the Ninth U.S. Army.
2. It is forwarded to you with the thought that it may be of some interest or value.

  
RAYMOND S. McLAIN  
Major General, US Army  
Commanding

1 Incl: Program for Tng Demonstration.

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P R O G R A M

2d Armored Division Tank-Infantry Demonstration

(To be held in vicinity of Alsdorf, Germany, on 13  
& 14 December 1944)

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>
1030-1130A	Talk by Maj Gen E. N. Harmon, Commanding General 2d Armored Division, on team-play and coordination of tanks, infantry, artillery and air.	Princess Theater, Alsdorf
1130-1230A	Lunch	Vicinity of Princess Theater, Alsdorf
1300-1430A	Demonstration, tanks, infantry, and flame throwers in attack.	Vicinity of Alsdorf

NOTE: There will be signs directing visitors to the Princess Theater in the main square of Alsdorf; also 2d Armored Division Military Police to direct visitors to parking lots.


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HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS  
Office of the Corps Commander  
270

10 December 1944

At the direction of General Simpson, Commanding General, Ninth Army, the 2 Armored Division and 30 Infantry Division have been selected to conduct demonstrations based on combat experiences in recent operations.

These demonstrations are based on actual operations which in the opinion of this headquarters were outstanding.

  
RAYMOND S. McLAIN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

NOTES ON TANK-INFANTRY ACTION

BY MAJOR GENERAL E. N. HARMON

1. The secret of successful attack is close coordination of all means at the right time and place.
2. Take time to thoroughly coordinate and have all leaders understand details of plan of action.
3. Tanks should habitually lead and take the brunt of the battle in all cases where terrain is negotiable for tanks. Infantry must come up as rapidly as possible and closely support the tanks on all objectives.
4. Where there is little cover between objectives and distances are great, tanks must move rapidly and infantry meet tanks on objectives either by cover of smoke, fire or darkness. Where distances between objectives are small or good covered positions exist, tanks will normally wait for infantry to catch up and thus assist them over the ground.
5. Infantry must not be caught on the backs of tanks under shellfire or small arms fire. Infantry must not follow tanks so closely as to be caught under the shellfire directed at the tanks. Distances vary with the terrain. Normally, this distance should be approximately 200 yards.
6. Medium tanks should normally lead the attack, followed by infantry with some light tanks in front and some in rear of the infantry lines. There should always be some tanks in rear of the infantry to be able to come up forward on selected targets that may be passed over by the forward troops.
7. Chain of command should follow branch channels, i.e. orders to subordinate tank units should be given through the senior tank commander; orders for infantry units through the senior infantry commander present. This system is best for proper employment and for communication.
8. Tank destroyers should support attack from one 'hull-down' position to another, coming up fast as successive objectives are gained. Tank destroyers are normally broken up into platoons and are either attached or placed in support of tank companies and infantry companies. Their main purpose is to provide heavy direct gun power on the battlefield.
9. Communication between supporting arms vital. Pre-arranged plan must be worked out ahead of time. Infantry company commanders often ride in the tank of the tank commander supporting them.
10. Avoid breaking tanks down into too small units. Tanks should never operate less than platoons in strength. Tanks dissipated are tanks wasted.

NOTES ON TANK-INFANTRY ACTION

11. For efficient air-support, air observer should ride in tank far enough forward to see the formation to the front.
12. Artillery FO's must be in tanks accompanying the assault tank company commander.
13. Tank movement must be covered by direct tank fire, i.e. the overwatching principle, some tanks shoot while others bound forward. This is fundamental.
14. For heavy attack, create the most direct fire support possible by tanks and tank destroyers on the flanks of the attack.
15. In darkness or foggy weather, the infantry must lead and the tanks will follow closely ready to shoot when light conditions permit. In some cases it is better for tanks to remain formed in rear and come quickly forward on call by the infantry, thus reducing the chance for artillery fire on the infantry occasioned by the noise of the approaching tanks.
16. Towns should normally be encircled by tanks with objective to reach farthest exit and block while some tanks accompany the infantry directly into the town to assist in mopping up and some tanks from the block in front, turn back into the town to attack the enemy from the rear.
17. Always attempt to get some tanks in rear of the enemy position. When this is accomplished, the fighting is generally over.
18. On defense, insist on physical contact between infantry and tanks. The man in the fox-hole must know where the tank nearest him is located. The tanker is uneasy at night unless he knows the infantryman is covering him.
19. Defensive positions and all objectives must be quickly and efficiently organized to meet counterattacks. This means a tie-in of local communication, a local plan of action, and physical contact between small units up forward.
20. Artillery fires should be capable of being massed to the maximum extent possible on any point on the battlefield. This means forward observers of the basic supporting artillery battalion should be hooked up so that the fires of other battalions can be brought in on their target on call.
21. Special provisions must be made prior to an attack for assisting


NOTES ON TANK-INFANTRY ACTION

tanks over obstacles. This must not be left to chance.

22. Tanks must frequently come out of the fight to replenish ammunition and gas. Provisions must be made for reserve platoons to exchange with forward platoons so as to have no interruption in tank support. The spectacle of tanks leaving the battlefield for ammunition is often demoralizing to our infantry in a hard fight. Avoid this by proper forethought and timing.


23. In a hard fight it is better and less costly to rush the hostile position and take heavy initial losses than to act with irresolution and over-caution with the final result of failing to take the objective with large accumulative losses all during the day.

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
 Diagrammatic  
NORMAL ATTACK




MAJ GEN E. N. HARMON  
 2<sup>nd</sup> Armid. Div.


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Illustrating coordination with Artillery and flanking fire of tanks in position to help Infantry forward to gain Objective.



Infantry and Tanks meet On Objective,  
 Infantry taking advantage of Cover in  
 Town to come behind Medium tank attack  
 which approached over long open  
 stretch of terrain. Light tanks with Infantry.



Combined attack-five  
directions, reduced Strong  
hostile position and four  
towns. Captured 841 Prisoners.



## P R O G R A M

### 30 Infantry Division Attack on a Fortified Village

(To be held in vicinity of St Joris, Germany, on 13  
& 14 December 1944)

#### SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>
1030-1035A	Opening remarks by Maj Gen Leland S. Hobbs, Commanding General 30 Infantry Division.	CP, 30 Infantry Division
1035-1200A	Talk by Brig Gen W. D. Harrison, Assistant Division Commander, 30 Infantry Division	CP, 30 Infantry Division
1200-1300A	Lunch	CP, 30 Infantry Division
1300-1600A	Visit to Battlefield	Vicinity of St Joris

NOTE: Guides and signs will mark route to battlefield.

## METHOD OF ATTACK AGAINST VILLAGES

Used by the 30th Infantry Division In  
The Advance to the Inde River  
November 16 to 28, 1944

1. SITUATION -- In the zone of attack there were a succession of small villages within mutually supporting distance of one another, the intervening terrain being generally open with excellent fields of fire. Each village was a defended strong point. Usually there were one or more tanks or self-propelled guns in each village.

2. BASIC METHOD -- Enemy defensive fires were neutralized by intense fire by all types of weapons on the village to be attacked and on adjacent enemy localities within effective direct fire range of assaulting troops. Simultaneously with the opening of these fires the assault troops advanced rapidly by the safest route to the village and attacked defenders. The assault was made from one or two directions.

### 3. DETAILS

a. Artillery and mortars fire on time schedule based on time required for assault troops to reach the village. Accurate schedule is essential. Subsequent fires are on call.

b. Direct fire weapons in support (tanks, antitank, tank destroyer, .30 and .50 cal. machine guns) fire on time schedule or visual control, or combination of both methods.

c. The attack is launched from a defended base. That is, anti-tank weapons and machine guns are sited to cover the flanks and rear of the assault troops against counterattack during the attack and occupation of the objective. Artillery and mortars have prepared concentrations for the same purpose.

d. Direct fire weapons can support the assault for the greatest time if the direction of their fire is perpendicular to the direction of the assault.

e. After artillery and mortar fire lifts from near edge of village the assault infantry utilizes rifle grenade and small arms fire to neutralize enemy fire during the remaining distance to the village. Tanks fire with machine gun and cannon.

f. In order not to give the enemy time to initiate effective resistance after support fires have lifted assault troops are so disposed as to swarm over the entire village quickly. For this purpose each house or section of the village is assigned to a squad or platoon as its immediate objective. By using vertical photos, or tracings or sketches therefrom, for briefing the men, and by advancing rapidly on a broad front designated houses can be assaulted before the Germans are prepared to resist effectively. An attack direction perpendicular to the long axis of the village facilitates rapid capture of the village and prevents enemy defense in depth.

g. Tanks have been used effectively to furnish fire support, to accompany the assault troops, to support by fire initially and then assault at full speed so as to arrive on the objective with the infantry. In general the difficulty of operating tanks off the roads has reduced their effectiveness and increased their losses. The presence of tanks with the infantry increases the effectiveness of the latter immensely.

h. For the defeat of hostile tanks in the villages the assault infantry should include trained antitank assault teams. The latter are composed of two elements--men armed to put the tank out of action, and a group to provide support for their advance. For operation in daylight smoke grenades (rifle and hand) are essential.

i. The attack plan and order includes details for the defense of the village against counterattack after capture. Some antitank or tank destroyer guns and heavy machine guns move into the town as soon as practicable behind the assault infantry. Mines are laid on tank approaches. Artillery and mortar support are prearranged. Preplanning is made possible by the use of vertical photos, maps and visual reconnaissance.

j. Surprise and speed prevent effective hostile artillery and mortar reaction until too late. Vary the time and direction of the assault. Make feints at other points if ammunition is available.

k. Lear enemy's defense fires: location of direct fire weapons, location of mortar and artillery concentrations in order to neutralize or avoid them. Hostile artillery and mortar reaction may be drawn by sudden concentration of smoke or artillery fire. Use patrols and observation posts to determine details of enemy defense.

l. Where three or more villages are approximately abreast it is advantageous to capture a flank village first since generally more converging fires can be placed on it, assault troops are less vulnerable, and after capture the village facilitates fires and assault on the adjacent village.

m. If the village is located on a reverse slope so as to prevent direct fire support and effective artillery and mortar observation it is frequently advisable to make the assault during darkness. Such attack has the added advantage of handicapping hostile tanks and self-propelled guns in the village.

n. The method described above is a coordinated attack which may require less than an hour for execution, but it requires several or more hours for preparation. Preparation includes not only the coordination of artillery, mortar, tank, tank destroyer, antitank and infantry fire plans, but also the careful briefing of squads of the assault troops. Time for preparation between successive attacks can be shortened by using different battalions for successive objectives so that planning can be done by one battalion while another is executing its attack. Usually by the use of vertical photos and maps much of the planning can be done concurrently by the various battalions. It has been found that these coordinated attacks have gained more objectives in a given time and eliminated more of the enemy with minimum loss to our own troops than when the attacking units are under

pressure to inch forward, showing some progress hourly.

4. EXAMPLES -- The attack by the 117 Infantry supported by 120 Infantry on St Joris - Kinzweiler, and the attack by the 120 Infantry supported by the 117 Infantry on Lurken - Langweiler - Laurensburg are cited as illustrations of the methods described.

SCHEDULE OF ARTILLERY FIRES

H to H plus 5

70 FA Bn: Cns. 8C6, 8C7, 8C9. Method of fire: Btry IV per minute on each. (72 rds).

203 FA Bn: Cns. 8, 10, 11. Method of Fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each. (36 rds).

113 FA Bn: Cns. 8C3, 8C4, 8C5. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each. (36 rds).

119 FA Bn: Cns. 19, 18, 17. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each (155G) (36 rds).  
Cns. C30, 7, 97C, 98C, 4, 3. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each. (155H) (72 rds).  
Cns. 37, 28, 29. Method of fire: Plat IV every 2 minutes on each. (8" H) (18 rds).

XIX Corps Arty: Cns. 9C0, 9C1, 8C8. Method of fire. Btry IV every 2 minutes on each (155H) (36 rds).  
Cns. 6, 5, 99C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 2 minutes on each. (8" H) (18 rds).  
Cns. 94C, 95C, 92C. Method of fire: 1 round every 2 minutes on each (240H) (9 rds).  
Cns. 3C9, 50, 52, 54, 43, 48. Method of fire: Btry IV every minute on each (4.5G) (144 rds).

H to H plus 30

92 Gml Bn: Neutralize area "Y" (200 rds).

H plus 6 to H plus 11

70 FA Bn: Cns. 8C6, 8C7, 8C9. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each (72 rds).

203 FA Bn: Cns. 8, 10, 11. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes on each (48 rds).

113 FA Bn: Cns. 8C3, 8C4, 8C5. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes on each (48 rds).

119 FA Gp: Cns. 19, 18, 17. Method of fire: Plat IV every 3 minutes on each (155G) (24 rds).  
Cns. C30, 7, 97C, 98C, 4, 3. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes on each. (155H) (96 rds).  
Cns. 37, 28, 29. Method of fire: Plat IV every 3 minutes on each. (8" H) (24 rds).

XIX Corps Arty: Cns. 9C0, 9C1, 8C8. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes on each (155H) (48 rds).  
Cns. 6, 5, 99C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 2 minutes on each. (8" H) (24 rds).  
Cns. 94C, 95C, 92C. Method of fire: 1 round every 3 minutes on each. (240 H) (12 rds).  
Cns. 3C9, 50, 52, 54, 43, 48. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes on each (4.5G) (96 rds). Note: Not shown on overlay A-1. Located about 1500 yards SW of St Joris.


H plus 16 to H plus 28

118 FA Bn: Cns. C96, C97, and coords: 89404865. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes on each. Fuze delay (60 rds). Not shown on overlay A-1.

H plus 16 to H plus 60

203 FA Bn: Neutralize Area "C1" (48 rds).

119 FA Gp: Neutralize Area "A1", "D1".



The general artillery plan was to pound both objectives with all available artillery for 15 minutes commencing at H hour. Only the direct support battalion (118 FA) was omitted from this plan. From H plus 15 to H plus 60 areas from which the enemy could hinder the attack were neutralized or harassed. The direct support battalion initially neutralized the RR on the right flank and then fired successive concentrations, controlled by observers in Warden and in built up area west of Warden, in front of both objectives and then thru them. After this the direct support battalion was available for fires on call as was part of the divisional and corps artillery after H plus 15. In addition to those fires listed in the fire plan corps artillery fired counterbattery missions on previously located enemy batteries and the VII Corps Artillery neutralized the north end of Rohe and Durwiss from H to H plus 30.

SUPPORT FIRES BY 120TH INFANTRY**MG'S & TANKS:**

MG targets: See overlay.

Tank targets: Bldgs N edge of St Joris and targets of opportunity.

0800-0805: Slow rate of fire.

0805 until masked by advancing Inf medium rate of fire. (Fire is masked when Inf is within 200 yds of line of fire)

When lines of initial fires are masked, tanks and MG's will traverse right, keeping fire well ahead of troops.

South MG's will infiltrate streets of St Joris, if possible.

CAUTION: When troops disappear into hedges N of town or into town, do not fire into town.

Tanks will fire not over a total of 20 rounds WP between 0800 and 0805 only. If smoke screen starts to build up, cease WP fire.

Officers will check to prevent gunners from endangering friendly troops.

**MORTARS:**

(1) 1st Bn 60mm

(2) 2nd Bn 60mm

(3) 1st Bn 81mm


(4) 2nd Bn 81mm

(5) Captured mortars

Time of fire: 0800-0815, with increased rate from 0810 to 0815.

**TD AND AT:**All TD and AT guns in position to fire into St Joris and/or Kinzweiler will fire on buildings and targets of opportunity from 0800 until targets are masked. (See caution and definition of masking, above).

When troops enter town, all wpns will fire on targets of opportunity S of St Joris and Kinzweiler. No friendly troops will be S of town. However, friendly troops will be on S edges.

Fire Plan 117th InfMortar cnr "A" from H to H plus 15  
Mortar cnr "B" from H plus 15 to H plus 30.

57 mm and 3" TD Guns fired on OP's and buildings.

MG's fired until masked (LMG's and cal. .50 MG fired from second floor of buildings.

ILLUSTRATION NO. 1

Attack by 117th Infantry  
on  
St. Joris - Kinzweiler  
19 November 1944

1. MAPS -- Germany: 1/25,000, Second Edition (AEF), Sheet 5103; Map A with overlays A-1 and A-2 herewith.


2. SITUATION AND MISSION -- See Map A. After two and one half days of offensive action the 117th Infantry, advancing generally east of south, had reached on 18 November the line: unnamed village at (9251) - Warden. It had contact with the 120th Infantry which occupied Neusen - Linden on its right. Hostile forces were known to be defending a general line of village strong points from St. Joris northeast thru Kinzweiler - Langweiler to the northeast. Under threat of German counterattack from the east Warden and Hongen were organized for defense. The mission of the 117th Infantry was to capture St. Joris and Kinzweiler.

3. SCHEME OF MANEUVER -- After considering the advisability of attacking St. Joris first and then Kinzweiler the CO 117th Infantry, Col Walter M. Johnson, decided that the means available permitted attack on both villages simultaneously. The attack was made at 0800A with two battalions (each with a platoon of medium tanks attached) abreast. Each battalion had two rifle companies in the assault echelon. Tanks initially fired in support from positions near the line of departure, then advanced at full speed (with 4 infantrymen mounted on top of each tank) to arrive on the objective with the assault companies. Several tanks were damaged by mines. The 120th Infantry supported the attack by heavy fire from positions west of St. Joris. For support fires see overlay A-1 (artillery) and A-2 (direct and mortar).

4. RESULTS -- a. Time -- Objective reached 0819. Consolidated by 0845.

b. Success -- 223 PW's (including 2 battalion commanders and staffs); a number of German dead; 3 SP guns, 4 75mm AT guns, 4 half-tracks, large stores of artillery, mortar and small arms ammunition and AT and AP mines captured.

c. Own Casualties -- 4 KIA; 35WIA (includes casualties throughout ensuing day caused by harassing artillery fire).



70th FA Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  5--Cn. 94C. Method of fire: Bn. IV per minute (72 rds)  
H  $\neq$  6 to H  $\neq$  10 Cn. 94C. Method of fire: Bn. IV every 2 minutes (36 rds)  
T to T  $\neq$  5--Cn. 78C. Method of fire. Bn. IV per minute (72 rds)  
T  $\neq$  6 to T  $\neq$  14--Cn. 78C. Method of fire. Bn. IV every 2 minutes (60 rds)  
118th FA Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  14--Cns. 95505125, 95365131, 95225137. Method of fire:  
Btry IV every 2 minutes on each. (96 rds)  
T to T  $\neq$  14--Cns. 68C, 69C, 76C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on  
each. (96 rds)  
197th FA Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  5--Coor. 95905120, 95825135, 95545151. Method of fire:  
Btry IV per minute on each. (72 rds)  
H  $\neq$  6 to H  $\neq$  14--Coor. 95905120, 95825135, 95545151. Method of fire: Btry  
IV every 2 minutes on each. (60 rds)  
909th FA Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  60--Neutralize Cns. 82C, 83C, 84C. (120 rds)  
203rd FA Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  5--Cns. 93C, 90C, 89C, Method of fire: Btry IV every 2  
minutes on each (36 rds)  
H  $\neq$  6 to H  $\neq$  15--Cns. 93C, 90C, 89C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes  
on each. (48 rds)  
T to T  $\neq$  5--Cns. 66C, 71C, 73C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on  
each. (36 rds)  
T  $\neq$  6 to T  $\neq$  12--Cns. 66C, 71C, 73C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes  
on each. (36 rds)  
113th FA Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  5--Coor. 95645168, Cns. 01C, 03C, Btry IV every 2  
minutes on each. (36 rds)  
H  $\neq$  6 to H  $\neq$  15--Coor. 95645168, Cns. 01C, 03C, Btry IV every 3 minutes on  
each. (48 rds)  
H  $\neq$  16 to H  $\neq$  60--Neutralize Area "F". (60 rds)  
T to T  $\neq$  5--Cns. 80C, 81C, 82C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on  
each. (36 rds)  
T  $\neq$  6 to T  $\neq$  15--Cns. 80C, 81C, 82C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes  
on each. (48 rds)  
T  $\neq$  16 to T  $\neq$  60--Neutralize Area "F". (60 rds)  
"C" Co 92nd Mortar Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  60--Neutralize Cns. 65C, 72C, 71C, 73C, 70C,  
74C. (360 rds)  
T to T  $\neq$  8--Cns. 65C, 66C, 72C. Plat. IV per min on each. (108 rds)  
"A" Co 823rd TD Bn.--H to H  $\neq$  60--Neutralize Cns. 78C, 79C, 80C, 81C. (150 rds)  
T to T  $\neq$  60--Neutralize Areas K & L. (150 rds)  
119th FA Group--H to H  $\neq$  5--Cns. 71C, 73C, 69C. Method of fire; Plat IV every 2  
minutes on each. (8" Howitzer) (18 rds)  
Cns. 89C, 90C, 91C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each. (155 How)  
(36 rds)  
Cns. 10C, 11C, 17C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 2 minutes on each. (155 Gun)  
(18 rds)  
H  $\neq$  6 to H  $\neq$  15--Cns. 71C, 73C, 69C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 3 minutes  
on each. (8" Howitzer) (24 rds)  
Cns. 89C, 90C, 91C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 3 minutes on each. (155 How)  
(48 rds)  
Cns. 10C, 11C, 17C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 3 minutes on each. (155 Gun)  
(24 rds)  
T to T  $\neq$  5--Cns. 70C, 79C, 83C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 2 minutes on each.  
(8" Howitzer) (18 rds)  
Cns. 67C, 74C, 75C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 min on each. (155 How)  
(36 rds)  
Cns. 13C, 14C, 15C. Method of fire: Platoon IV every 2 min on each. (155 Gun)  
(18 rds)  
T  $\neq$  6 to T  $\neq$  15--Cns. 70C, 79C, 83C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 3 minutes  
on each. (8" Howitzer) (24 rds)

Cns. 56C, 74C, 75C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 3 minutes on each.  
(155 Gun) (24 rds)

XIX Corps Arty.--H to H + 14--Cns. 92C, 95C, 91C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 2 minutes on each. (8" Howitzer) (48 rds)

Cns. 83C, 79C, 78C. Method of fire: 1 Round every 2 minutes on each.

(240 Howitzer) (24 rds

Cns. 12C, 13C, 15C, 16C, 18C, 20C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each. (4.5 Gun) (192 rds)

T to T / 14-Cn. 16C. Method of fire: 1 Round every 2 minutes. (240 Howitzer)  
(8 rds)

Cns. 11C, 17C. Method of fire: Plat IV every 2 minutes on each. (8" Howitzer)


Cns. 10C, 18C, 19C. Method of fire: Btry IV every 2 minutes on each. (4.5 Gun) (16 rds)

Ans. 100, 100, 100. Method of fire. Bury in every 2 minutes on each. (4.) Gun (96 rds)

93

The general artillery plan for the attack on these towns was essentially the same as for the attack on St. Joris and Kinzweiler. Hit the objective with all available artillery for a short period while the infantry is advancing, leaving only the direct support battalion free for close-in fires and fires on call. At the conclusion of this short period neutralize and harass known or suspected observation points, direct and automatic weapons positions and seal off the area being attacked to prevent reinforcement of it.

B-1



LEGEND:

- (1) 2d Bn captured mortars
- (2) 1st Bn " "
- (3) 117th Inf Mortars, 60mm
- (4) " " " "
- (5-6) " " 81mm
- (7) Tk mortars
- (8) 117th Inf Mortars, 60mm
- (9) " " 81mm
- (11) 335th " " 60mm
- (12) " " 81mm
- (13) " " " "
- (14) Tk Mortars
- (10) 117th Inf MG
- (15) " " "
- (16) " " "
- (17) 335th " "
- (18-19-20) Tks
- (21) 2d Bn, 120th Inf, MG

TIME SCHEDULE:

H to H  $\neq$  15: (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (15) (16) - Neutralizing  
 (2) (7) (8) (9) (11) (12) ----- Harrassing  
 (10) (20) ----- Targets of opportunity (Caution:  
 Targets must be positively identified as hostile)

H  $\neq$  15 to T: (2) (7) (8) (9) (11) (12) ----- Harrassing


T to T  $\neq$  15: (2) (7) (8) (9) (11) (12) (17) (18) (19) (21) - Neutralizing  
 (13) (14) ----- Harrassing

T  $\neq$  15 to A: (13) (14) ----- Harrassing

A to A  $\neq$  10: (13) (14) (18) ----- Neutralizing

NOTES:

"H" hour will be at 0800  
 "T" and "A" hours will be announced later.  
 MG & Tk position areas as shown are general areas; Commanders will choose exact areas.  
 823d TD Bn will fire on Objectives as follows:  
 "Z" H to "H"  $\neq$  15  
 "X" T to "T"  $\neq$  15  
 Bns, 120 Inf, will prepare and execute fire plan for organic MG's & mortars  
 AT guns 117 Inf fired at bldgs and OP's LMG's & cal. .50 MG's 117 Inf fired from 2d floor of buildings in Warden and Kinzweiler



OVERLAY B2  
 DIRECT & MORTAR FIRE PLAN

ILLUSTRATION NO. 2

Attack by 120th Infantry  
on  
Lurken-Langweiler-Laurensberg  
21 November 1944

1. MAPS -- Germany: 1/25,000, Second Edition (AEF), Sheet 5103; Map B with overlays B-1 and B-2.

2. SITUATION AND MISSION -- See Map B. On 20 November the 117th Infantry occupied the villages: St. Joris-Kinzweiler-Warden. The division reserve (a battalion from 335th Infantry) occupied Hongen. German troops were known to defend the villages: Lurken, Langweiler and Laurensberg. Elements of the 104th Division were to attack Hehlrath early on 21 November. The 120th Infantry, having completed its mission in the vicinity of Broichweiden, was ordered to attack on 21 November capturing initially the villages Lurken, Langweiler and Laurensberg and then to continue its attack to the east.

3. SCHEME OF MANEUVER -- Observing that the German defensive organization faced generally northwest and that Kinzweiler was behind the left flank of the German known positions, the CO, 120th Infantry, Col. Branner P. Purdue, decided to make his main attack from Kinzweiler in the direction Lurken-Laurensberg. The attack was made in two phases. First, one battalion attacked at 0800 from Kinzweiler and captured Lurken and the knoll 500 yards to the east of Lurken, from which positions it could support by fire attacks on Langweiler and Laurensberg, could fire on Germans attempting to escape from Laurensberg, and could protect the flank against counterattack from the east or southeast. This battalion, the 2nd, attacked with two companies abreast and one platoon of tanks. Two tanks supported with fire, three accompanied the infantry. In the second phase the 1st Battalion attacked at T-hour (0945) with two companies advancing abreast through Lurken on Laurensberg while B Company attacked Langweiler from Warden. This attack was similarly accompanied by tanks.


4. RESULTS -- a. Time -- By approximately 1100 the objectives had all been taken and consolidated except that "C" Company was still engaged in cleaning out Obermerz (NE of Langweiler).

b. Enemy -- Approximately 200 PW's and 50 casualties.

c. Own Casualties --

	1st Bn	2nd Bn
KIA	4	2
WIA	36 (note)	13
MIA	1	0

Note: The majority of 1st Bn WIA casualties resulted when Company "B" followed their artillery fire too closely.





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H



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