

6 10/15/44

S-E-C-R-E-T
HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 15 Oct 44 *
* Init: H 78 *

From: 140001A Oct 44
To : 142400A Oct 44

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 122

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

No change except in sector of 116th Inf Regt where enemy still holds S & SE part of WURSELEN. The enemy has been cleared down to road at K-865485 between K-862484 and K-867484.

b. Units in Contact

113th Cav and 29th Div front:

Tng Bns of 176th Div including 22nd GAF Regt.
NCO Bn Duren.
1st Bn, 343rd Regt, 183rd Div.
NCO Bn Julich.

2nd Armd Div front:

330th Regt, 183rd Div.
771st Guard Bn.
183rd Fusilier Bn.

30th Div front:

503rd Mobile Bn.
1st Bn, 689th Regt, 246th Div.
2108th Pz Gren Bn (remnants only).
One Bn, 49th Div (all that remains of Div.)
7th TD Bn.
302nd West Bn.
506th Tank Bn.
116th Panzer Div.
1st & 2nd Bn, 60th Pz Gren Regt.
675th Pz Engr Bn.
116th Ren Bn (new identification).

c. Artillery

Seventy-eight (78) shellreps received at Corps FDC.
Fifty-three (53) new enemy btry locations.
Ten (10) suspected enemy btry locations.
Our arty fired 106 counter-btry missions during the period.

DECLASSIFIED

Light, medium and a few rounds of heavy caliber arty received from position areas to N, NE, E, and SE of Corps sector. At 2230 hours an enemy bn was reported firing from K-9754 grid square.

d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

At 1635 hours Tac/R picked up the movement of an armored column at F-1318. This coupled with an OSS report and other reliable information indicates that 3rd Pz Gren Div will appear in the battle area between XIX Corps and VII Corps.

Information from VII Corps indicated 10 to 20 enemy convoys on road from COLOGNE to DUREN. The type vehicles in convoys not reported. However, this may well be the 9th Pz Div moving into the area since it has not been in contact with the British for the past three days.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

a. General Summary

The enemy stubbornly resisted our advance in the WURSELEN area with heavy volume of arty, small arms fire and roving tanks.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Moderate to heavy throughout the period. The 116th Inf Regt received a heavy volume of arty throughout the period. Most of shelling was on the forward elements, however one concentration of 30 rounds estimated 75mm fell in area of 230th Field Arty Bn.

(2) Infantry - Fought defensively throughout the period from dug-in positions and houses on N edge of WURSELEN and SW of WURSELEN.

(3) Tanks - Did not appear in large numbers, however 6 - 8 tanks supported infantry in the WURSELEN area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather 142000A - 152000A Oct.

Broken low clouds tonight with scattered showers. Low clouds becoming scattered in early morning increasing to broken during mid-morning persisting for rest of period. Scattered showers tomorrow afternoon.

b. The 3rd Pz Gren Div is composed of 103rd Pz Bn, 8th Pz Gren Regt, 29th Pz Gren Regt, 103rd Pz Rcn Bn, 3rd AT Bn, 3rd Mtz Arty Regt, 3rd Engr Bn, 3rd Sig Bn.

This unit was originally the 3rd Inf Div and as such took part in Polish and French campaigns. Organized as 3rd Pz Gren Div Autumn 1940. Fought in Russia - virtually destroyed at STALINGRAD. Reformed in France, Spring 1943. Moved to ITALY where it was again cut up badly. Picked up reinforcements and appeared in BELFORT area 15 Sept where it has been engaged up to present time. Units identified in BELFORT GAP area were 103rd Pz Rcn Bn, 8th Pz Gren Regt, 29th Pz Gren Regt and Div Hq. Estimated strength 7500. The Tank Bn was not identified in the south, but Tac/R indicated some tanks are moving north with this unit.

DECLASSIFIED

c. "The following captured document of 59 Inf Div dated 21 Sep. lays down the terms to be used in returns of the strength and mobility of the units in 88 Corps. Of special interest are the figures given for bn strength.

Extract of Captured Document

The str will be given as follows:-

| | |
|--|--------------------------|
| Strong Bn | above 400 men battle str |
| Medium " | " 300 " " " |
| average " | " 200 " " " |
| weak " | " 100 " " " |
| exhausted bn (abgekampft) below 100 men battle str." | |

(Source: 8th British Corps Int. Summary No. 79).

d. Use of Red Smoke by the Enemy to Attract our Fighter-Bombers

"On 8 October forward observer of 92nd F.A. Bn called upon his battalion to fire red smoke to mark a target for fighter-bombers operating with CC "B", 2nd Armd Div. Target location was at K-872630. Red smoke was fired by the artillery battalion at 1254A. Fighter-bombers observed smoke but did not attack target.

Immediately after rounds of friendly red smoke landed on target, enemy 81mm mortars fired red smoke which landed at K-870623. Fighter-bombers did not attack.

Red smoke employed by the enemy did not appear as dense as our own.
(Source: 2nd Armd Div Memorandum)

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(1) The enemy is capable of delaying our attack to the S with 116th Pz Div, elements of 2nd Pz Div and a battle group from 1st SS Pz Div supported by 8 - 10 bns of arty.

(2) The enemy can counterattack with the forces mentioned in (1) above.

1 Incl.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report

George F. Graybill
Major GSC
for WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

Distribution:

Same as G-2 Periodic Report #121

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 122400 TO 132400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 107.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|---------------------------|------------|----------------|
| 116th Pz | 69 | 60th Pz Gren Regt | | |
| | | 1st Bn | 33 | 30th Div |
| | | 2nd Bn | 2 | " " |
| | | 675th Pz Engr Bn | 34 | " " |
| 246th Inf | 12 | 689th Regt 2nd Bn | 4 | 30th Div |
| | | 246th Arty Regt | 3 | " " |
| | | 246th Engr Bn | 5 | " " |
| 49th Inf | 9 | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 8 | 30th Div |
| | | 13th Co | 1 | " " |
| 1st SS | 6 | 1st SS Regt | | |
| | | Battle Group "Ring" | 6 | 30th Div |
| | | 108th Pz Brig | | |
| | | 2108th Pz Gren Bn | 4 | 30th Div |
| | | 503rd Mobile Bn | | |
| | | (Regt v. Fritschen) | 2 | 30th Div |
| ? | | 306th Marsch Bn | 1 | 29th Div |
| ? | | NCO School "DUEREN" | 3 | " " |
| ? | | Straggler | 1 | " " |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|----------|------------|
| 29th Div | 5 |
| 30th Div | 102 |
| 2nd Armd | 0 |
| | <u>107</u> |

Three PWs reported from 113th Cav Gp during previous period were cleared through 29th Div cage and included in the total PWs from that unit.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 29,673.

IPW TEAM #39

⑦ 10/15/44
1174

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of AC of S, G-2
O/B Team No 11

14 October 1944

First US Inf Div estimates that the following forces are defending the Garrison of Aachen:

| <u>Strength</u> | <u>Unit</u> |
|-----------------|--|
| 450 | 19 GAF Bn |
| 400 ? | 34 MG Bn |
| 350 | 1421 Inf Fortress MG Bn |
| 250 | 2nd Bn, 689th Inf Regt & Battlegroup Diemel |
| 150 | 2nd Bn, 352nd Regt |
| 200 | Elements of 2nd Pz Div |
| 400 | 404th Inf Regt |
| 100 | Misc. units |
| <hr/> 2300 | <hr/> Total strength of forces defending Garrison Aachen |

④
10/16/44

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 16 Oct 44 *
* Init: *MAC* *

From: 150001A Oct 44
To : 152400A Oct 44

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 123

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

No change except in the sector of the 116th Regt where the enemy line is now K860476 - K865477 - K870480.

b. Defensive Organization

Recent air photos up to 13 Oct 44 show the following enemy activity on our front:

Work is continuing on previously reported AT ditches.

There has been a decided increase in infantry strongpoints along the entire Corps front. These positions consist of weapons pits, fire trenches and fox-holes, and usually tie in with AT ditches.

Many small towns, for example ERKELENZ, LIDMICH and ALDENHOVEN, are being surrounded by defenses consisting of AT ditches, infantry strongpoints and possible minefields. This is particularly evident on the western approaches to these towns.

c. Units in Contact

Only one new unit was identified on the front during the period - the 2nd Bn, 6th Landesschutz Bn, whose organization has not yet been revealed. The major portion of PWs taken during the period came from the 60th Pz Gren Regt of the 116th Pz Div.

d. Artillery

Sixty-eight (68) shellreps were received during the period.

Thirty-eight (38) new enemy btrys were located.

Thirteen (13) suspected btry locations.

Our arty fired one hundred and nine (109) counter-btry missions during the period.

e. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

The 156th Pz Gren Regt of the 116th Pz Div still remains unidentified though presumably in the area and thus remaining an immediate reserve.

One Bn of the 8th Pz Gren Regt and one Bn of the 29th Pz Gren Regt were identified today on the 1st Div front which leaves the remainder of these regts

of the 3rd Pz Gren Div as possible reserves though more likely to be committed in the VII Corps sector.

The 9th Pz Div, unidentified for several days since last reported in contact on the British front, remains as the most likely candidate for the next major reserve brought into the area. However no confirmed evidence yet substantiates this suspicion.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

Heavy resistance was again offered to our advance to the south in the WURSELEN vicinity. This area, well suited to defensive fighting, was bitterly defended by a volume of small arms, heavy observed mortar fire, moderate arty and by heavy dug-in tanks. The better trained and more determined PWs taken in the fighting here are indicative of the violence of the battle.

Elsewhere on the front enemy activity was confined to moderate arty, some mortar fire and normal patrolling.

Tac/R reported no significant movements into this sector during the period. Considerable movement of vehicles and foot troops were reported late in the period to the E and NE from the vicinity of WEIDEN. Not enough is known about this to suggest a conclusion.

VII Corps: Two counterattacks were launched by the newly identified 3rd Pz Gren Div against 1st Inf Div - the first at 1000 with a company of tanks and a battalion of infantry in the vicinity of K9045. The second of these counterattacks began at 1240 in the vicinity of K8845 with the same force with the mission of re-taking VERLAUTENHEIDE K6845. No penetrations were made by the enemy.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery

Enemy arty fire lessened during the period with generally quiet hours during the night with the exception of the 29th Div which received some shelling in the zone of the 115th Inf.

In the 30th Div zone enemy btry's commenced greater activity at approximately 1100 and continued throughout the afternoon and evening. All reports indicated bulk of fires to be harassing with light and medium calibers.

The largest concentration was 60 rounds of 75mm caliber which fell in the position area of the 230th Field Arty Bn.

(2) Armor

A number of heavy enemy tanks fought from dug-in positions in the zone of our advance south. All along the front of the 30th Div small groups of tanks were observed.

(3) Air

No aggressive enemy air activity was reported during the period.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather

Much cloudiness and showers. Forecast for coming period: Scattered clouds with light showers late in the period.

b. Defensive Organization

(1) A study of the photography of the past three days indicates that the enemy has considerably stiffened his defenses on the northern part of the VII Corps front and on the entire XIX Corps sector. On the other hand, he has neglected his defenses on the southern half of the VII Corps and on the entire V Corps front.

(2) Tac/R reports following:

Scattered road blocks across both lanes of autobahn in vicinity of ESCHWEILER (K-9648) appeared to be dirt piles and debris braced with steel rails. Two on road between K-910466 and ESCHWEILER, and three between ESCHWEILER and F-090496.

F-1140 to F-1145 - Zig-zag trenches.

F-0547 - Bridge out, no shell craters in area.

F-6544 - Possible gun positions along road.

K-9275 to F-0560 - Continuous zig-zag trench, along east bank of ROER River approximately 100 yards from river bank.

K-987506 - 8-gun flak position.

K-035500 - Dirt entrenchments.

DUREN (F-1246) - Around town at 2000 ft radius is an arc of dirt zig-zag trenches on west bank of ROER River.

K-9656 - Possible gun position in field.

K-945550 - 5 gun flak position.

K-9251 - Possible 2-gun arty position. 1 gun seen firing. Also slit trenches with 12 men in each.

K-9955 - Newly dug w-type trenches. (Source: First US Army Periodic Report No. 126)

c. Smoke

Corps Arty reported the use of smoke shells by enemy mortars to prevent observation of artillery btrys. An arty observation plane in adjusting fire on the enemy btry observed these tactics.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Continued counterattacks in the general AACHEN area.

b. Counterattack from the GEILENKIRCHEN area.

c. Gradual withdrawal to the line of the ROER River.

S-E-C-R-E-T

They appear in order of highest probability. Certainly the enemy in bringing the 108th Pz Brigade, the 116th Pz Div, elements of the 1st SS Pz Div, elements of the 2nd Pz Div and the 3rd Pz Gren Div into the WEIDEN area in the past several days is not indicative of any intention to withdraw or to commit his very limited mobile forces to a purely defensive stand. The continued counterattacks against the 30th Div and the 1st Inf Div during the past several days by these mobile reserves brought from long distances is a preview to what we may expect in the coming days. The enemy perhaps looks to overcast skies as a valuable ally in accomplishing his task of preventing union between the VII and XIX Corps and in sealing off or destroying the penetrations that have been made.

The presence of 30 to 50 tanks in the area N of GEILENKIRCHEN, reported by Tac/R two days ago and somewhat confirmed by PWs, but since unobserved, is the only evidence of contemplated enemy action from that direction. Its advantages, however, are surely not overlooked by the enemy.

1 Incl.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report

Michael A. Casanovi
WASHINGTON PLATT
(for) Colonel, GSC *Capt.*
G-2

Distribution:

Same as G-2 Periodic Report #122

Annex #1 to
Periodic Report #123

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 132400 TO 142400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 95.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|---|------------|--|
| 1st SS | 23 | 1st SS Regt 1st Bn (Battle Group Rink) | 23 | 30th Div |
| 116th Pz | 39 | 60th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 1 | 30th Div |
| | | 2nd Bn | 26 | " " |
| | | 116th Pz Rcn Bn | 11 | " " |
| | | 657th Pz Engr Bn | 1 | " " |
| 246th Inf | 9 | 689th Regt 2nd Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| | | 246th Arty Regt | 7 | " " |
| 183rd Inf | 6 | 330th Regt 1st Bn | 1 | 2nd Armd Div |
| | | 183rd Fusilier Bn | 3 | " " " |
| | | 219th Arty Regt | 2 | " " " |
| ? | | 2108th Pz Gren Bn (108th Pz Brig) | 1 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Regt v. Fritschen | | |
| | | 506th Mobile Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Landesschuetzen Bn | | |
| | | 3/6 OSNABRUCK | 1 | 29th Div |
| ? | | 16th GAF Med Co | 1 | " " |
| ? | | 525th Landesschuetzen Bn | 1 | " " |
| ? | | 489th " " | 1 | " " |
| ? | | Army Group "MITTE" | 1 | 113th Cav Gp |
| ? | | Stragglers | 10 | 29th, 30th & 2nd Armd Divs, 113th Cav Gp & 1104th Engr C Gp |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|----------------|-----------|
| 29th Div | 5 |
| 30th Div | 80 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 7 |
| 113th Cav Gp | 2 |
| 1104 Engr C Gp | 1 |
| | <u>95</u> |

The five PWs shown above as taken by 29th Div were captured by 113th Cav Gp, but cleared through cage of former unit.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 29,661.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 17 Oct 44 *
* Init: THOC *

From: 160001A Oct 44
To : 162400A Oct 44

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 124

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

K-8046 - K-8147 - K-8347 - K-870475 - K-880500 - K-900522 - K-915565 -
K-915580 - K-905595 - K-900620 - K-860635 - K-845630 - K-855675 - K-8071 - K-7573 -
K-7074 - K-6775 - K-6577.

b. Units in Contact

North to South:

176th Div

2 Bns, 22nd Flieger Regt
464 Repl & Tng Bn
159 Repl & Tng Bn
6 Obsn & Tng Bn
6 Engr Repl Bn
176? Rcn Bn "Peterson"
167 Repl & Tng Bn

183rd Inf Div

1st Bn, 351st Regt
NCO Bn Duren
1st Bn, 343rd Regt) May be identical
NCO Bn Juelich)
219 Engr Bn
2nd Bn, 330th Regt

Mobile Regt von Fritschen

Mobile Bns, 503, 504 and 506

246th Inf Div

2nd Bn, 689th Regt
1st Bn, 689th Regt

1st SS Pz Div Adolf Hitler

CT Schmidt) 1st SS Pz Gren Regt
CT Ring)

506th GHQ Tank Bn, 20-30 Mk VI tanks

116th Pz Div

1st Bn, 156th Pz Gren Regt
10th Co, 156th Pz Gren Regt
116th Pz Rcn Bn
675th Engr Bn
60th Pz Gren Regt

6th Home Guard Regt
2nd Bn (under 352nd Inf Regt)
Battle Group Stack
302 West Bn
Remnants 49th Div, 149th Regt

In addition, the 7th and 741st GHQ TD Bns and the remnants of 108th Pz Brigade are located opposite 30th U.S. Inf Div.

c. Artillery

Seventy-five (75) shellreps were received during the period.
 Forty (40) new enemy btry locations were reported.
 Ten (10) suspected enemy btry locations were reported.
 Our arty fired ninety-three (93) counter-btry missions during the period.

d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

The 2d Bn of the 156th Pz Gren Regt remains unidentified and may be considered in immediate reserve.

While there continues to be no tangible evidence of the approach of the 9th Pz Div, yet the fact that it has been uncommitted in any area during the past week is reason to suspect it may appear as a reserve on this front.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

With all three regts of the 30th Div, an attached regt of the 29th Div and attached tank bn of the 2d Armd Div lashing out in strength today, the enemy's bitter battling with some of his elite troops to hold the gap into AACHEN open failed - for the drive south resulted in contact being made by elements of the 30th Div with the 1st Inf Div in early evening. The last escape gap for the estimated 1500-2000 Germans in AACHEN was thus closed.

Unusually intense arty, mortar and small arms fire resisted the diversionary attack on the left and in the center. On the right the regt which drove to the W and S met lighter resistance from the enemy, who had been misled by the diversion into believing the "closing" drive was coming from the left and center and so concentrated his arty for several hours in those sectors. Small arms, mortar and moderate arty in the afternoon, failed to halt this unit from driving south to close the trap even though the enemy fought from areas suited to stubborn defense.

The 2nd Armd Div and the 29th Div reported moderate arty and normal patrol activity as the extent of the enemy activity on their front. The 2nd Armd Div also reported increased activity from direct fire weapons.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Enemy arty activity was much the same as in the preceding report. Forward elements of the 29th and 30th Divs received moderate to heavy shelling, mostly during dayling hours, with light, medium and a few of heavy caliber.

One exception was a concentration of one hundred rounds of both medium and light calibers falling in the position area of the 183rd Field Arty Bn in the zone of the 29th Div. The 2nd Arm'd Div received light harassing fires during the day. In general, concentrations varied from six to twenty rounds. Active enemy btrys were to the NE, E and SE of the Corps zone.

(2) Air - The only enemy air reported during the period was 6 FW 190s flying over HEERLEN headed N at 1425. No aggressive action was taken by the planes.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather

Intermittent showers with much cloudiness. Forecast for the coming period: Broken clouds tonight and tomorrow with occasional overcast and few showers during the period.

b. PWs

Several significant facts are derived from PWs in recent interrogations:

(1) Replacements are reaching units more promptly. The 60th Pz Gren Regt received replacements within 36 hours from a replacement battalion attached to the division.

(2) New units and replacements are being rearmed with new equipment. Interrogation reveals that even new artillery pieces are being brought into the area. Panzer units are frequently equipped by new and not thoroughly tested tanks.

(3) The enemy makes every effort to recover disabled tanks. However loss of trained crews is the real headache to the Germans.

c. "More lights at night along the RHINE. Night fighters on intruder missions attacked illuminated cities along the RHINE including DUREN, DUSSELDORF, COLOGNE and BONN. At COLOGNE and EUSKIRCHEN-BONN the lights were not affected by bombing. At EVENHEIM, part of the lights in the city went out, but those on the outskirts of the city remained on after bombing. There was a considerable increase in the number of lighted towns, villages and even houses in the countryside throughout the RHINELAND. Early in the evening many fires and lights resembling unshaded street lights were observed in COLOGNE. Later in the evening the lights in COLOGNE were out but the fires were still burning. About midnight the lights went on again this time very brightly. At 150200A, 15 large orange-red lights or fires became visible in COLOGNE almost symmetrically spaced around the city outskirts. At 150130A similar lights or fires were observed in and around MUNCHEN-GLADBACH, and SOLINGEN." (Source: First U.S. Army Periodic Report #127).

d. German Manpower

"The Western front continues to drain the manpower of the whole REICH. During the month of Sep, it is estimated that about 230,000 men were brought up, of which over 100,000 were in fresh divs, between 10,000 and 20,000 in GHQ Tps (mainly pz bdes), some 50,000 in drafts, and over 50,000 in fortress bns (inf, MG and arty). These last vary in quality, but all are, of course, entirely static.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Many are formed from GAF ground organizations, sigs schools etc, in GERMANY, thus adding to the great inroads already made into that org, which has by now contributed GAF Fd Divs, Para Divs, and last but not perhaps least, the dozen or more Flying Trg Regts overrwn in the last Western Campaign which have been fighting so long and redoubtably as inf. A fair number of these fortress units are already in contact, but many more (the number is hard to guess) are reported to be manning fortified areas in the WEST WALL and the VOSGES which have not yet been reached.

"It should be remembered that cas during Sep continued to be very hy, and are most unlikely to have been less than 100,000 in the line (excl losses in fortresses, pockets etc). Many of the Sep newcomers are already burned out - for instance, the pz bdes and 553 and 559 Divs. All-in-all, C-in-C WEST probably has now over 300,000 tps at his disposal." (Source: Shaef Int Summary)

2 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps FW Report
Annex #2-The Ordensburg School for Future Fuehrers

Michael A. Cunningham
WASHINGTON PLATT
for Colonel, GSC *Cgt*
G-2

Distribution:

| | | | |
|---------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| FUSA (5) | 8th FA Bn | 49th AAA Brig | Air O |
| V Corps (2) | 119th FA Gp (5) | 32nd FA Brig | Arty (2) |
| VII Corps (2) | 228th FA Gp (5) | 116th Inf Regt | Combat Observers (6) |
| 2nd Armd Div | 113th Cav Gp (4) | 426th Med Bn | FL 20 |
| 5th Armd Div | 1104th Engr Gp (5) | 99th Inf Bn | MLI 424 |
| 1st Inf Div | 1128th Engr Gp (2) | 8th Corps (Brit) | IPW 39 |
| 29th Inf Div | 1115th Engr Gp (7) | 30th Corps (Brit) | Msg Cen (2) |
| 30th Inf Div | 1142nd Engr Gp (4) | CG XIX | G-2 File (10) |
| 2nd Sig Bn | 67th Tactical Rc. Gp | C/S | |
| 743rd Tank Bn | 3252 Sig Serv Co | G-1 | |
| 747th Tank Bn | 12th Army Gp | G-3 | |
| 2nd TD Gp (3) | 21st Army Gp | G-4 | |
| 12th AAA Gp | Det ZU, 21st MWU | War Room | |
| 7th Armd Gp | 16th AAA Gp | Engr | |
| 258th FA Gp | 68th Med Gp | Sig | |

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 142400 TO 152400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 99.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| 183rd Inf | 6 | 351st Regt 1st Bn 219th Arty Regt | 5 1 | 29th Div 2nd Armd Div |
| 246th Inf | 1 | 246th Arty Regt | 1 | 30th Div |
| 49th Inf | 2 | 149th Regt Hq 3rd Bn | 1 1 | 30th Div " " |
| 116th Pz | 67 | 60th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn 2nd Bn | 9 4 | 30th Div " " |
| | | 116th Pz Rcn Bn | 53 | " " |
| | | 146th Arty Regt | 1 | " " |
| ? | | 741st GHQ TD Bn | 4 | 30th Div |
| ? | | 1421st Fortress MG Bn | 3 | " " |
| ? | | 6th Landesschuetzen Regt | 7 | " " |
| ? | | 106th Fortress "Stamm" Co | 2 | " " |
| ? | | 54th Fortress MG Bn | 1 | 2nd Armd Div |
| ? | | 838th Landesschuetzen Bn | 1 | 29th Div |
| ? | | 22nd GAF Regt | 1 | " " |
| ? | | NCO School "DUEREN" | 2 | " " |
| ? | | Stragglers | 2 | " " |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to units capturing follows:

| | |
|--------------|-----------|
| 29th Div | 11 |
| 30th Div | 86 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 2 |
| | <u>99</u> |

Of the 11 PWs reported from 29th Div cage, 4 were taken by 113th Cav Gp, but reported through former unit.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 29,760.

IFW TEAM #39

THE ORDENSBURGEN SCHOOL FOR FUTURE FUHRERS

(The quotes below are from a captured document, "Der Weg zur Ordensburg" (The Origin of the Ordensburg), by Dr. Robert Ley, Reichsorganisationsleiter (Reich Organization Leader) of the NSDAP (Nazi Party). Dr. Ley, a member of Hitler's inner circle, was responsible for the building of the Ordensburgen and for the selection of students to attend these schools to train the future political leaders of Germany. If Dr. Ley's thoughts seem occasionally involved or confused the responsibility is his and not that of the translator.)

1. Ordensburg Graduates

a. Among the Nazi leaders whose detention is necessary none should have higher priority on our lists than men who have come out of the Ordensburgen. These Nazi "universities," (the word "Ordensburg" goes back to German medieval history when knights, such as the Teutonic Knights, were joined in an Order or Lodge, with a central shrine or headquarters in a Burg, or castle were created in 1933 to train Nazi political leaders "for the next thousand years." The Supermen who have come out of the Ordensburgen are thoroughly indoctrinated with Nazi ideology. They get or are eligible for the best political jobs in Germany and become Ortsgruppenleiter, Kreisleiter, Gauleiter and Reichsleiter. They are generally the most arrogant element in a not too modest community. In the last few years necessities of war have forced the Ordensburgen to give their students to the officers corps of the SS and Wehrmacht. Today thousands of Ordensburger are in the German forces or holding high political and administrative jobs inside Germany. There is no secret about Ordensburg graduates. In Germany they and their families make sure that everybody knows they belong to the chosen few. The Ordensburg themselves are now believed to be used by the Wehrmacht for various purposes.

2. Founding of the Ordensburgen

a. There are believed to be six to nine Ordensburgen in Germany. The first three, started in 1933 and opened in 1936, were Vogelsang, in the Eifel Mountains, southwest of Cologne, Sonthofen in the Bavarian Alps, and Croessensee in Pomerania.

b. "The Burgen were built from nothing. Where they stand there was nothing before. I did not want to rebuild old castles, because the new powerful ideas of Hitler cannot be preached in dusty buildings. In size and effect the Ordensburgen reflect the greatness of the Fuehrer's new and beautiful gospel."

3. Selection of Students

a. "The candidate must be a party member. But that is not enough. I must know that he has proven himself to be eager to work for the community and nation without any personal gain or glory. He must have the inner calling to work for his country for the rest of his life. All candidates will have to be recommended through party channels, and will have to be judged and selected at each step. I shall make the final selection. In that manner we will never send a dud to any "Ordensburg."

b. "The second requirement is that the candidate must be a perfect specimen of health. We do not mean only the healthy condition of his organs. We believe that we can read one's mind and soul by looking straight into one's eyes and face."

c. "The third question is: "are you healthy by heritage, is your family tree in perfect order? One is not only a product of the present time but also a product of one's blood."

d. "These requirements are very simple. In fact the intellectual might call them primitive and not understand them. All examinations are strictly forbidden. If we would have even a sketchy examination, we should soon have a college examination and later on a theological one."

e. "Tuition is free. In fact each student will get a salary, his uniform and lodgings free. His family, particularly in the case of married men, will be supported."

4. The Curriculum.

a. "The belief in the correctness of the National Socialistic ideology can be scientifically supported up to a certain point, where the ideas become unlimited and eternal. We believe that our teachings of race are correct. We believe that our culture is not only the product of eternal influences and education, but also the product of all deeds which our ancestors, from a lowly laborer to the highest artist, have accomplished. Those deeds are an expression of our discipline, and our discipline is a factor of our race. Therefore, our culture is a product of our race. Science is far enough advanced to prove the existence of high and low races. We know nowadays what a bastard is and a parasite. So we can say that our beliefs in race have turned into scientific knowledge. Therefore, we shall teach at our "Ordensburgen" Race, History, Art-history, Philosophy, Economics, and Social Science. Party Member Rosenberg himself will select the proper teachers for these subjects."

b. "The next subject is the physical education of these He-Men. Are you a He-Man, and are you willing to prove it? Therefore sports are the main part of this program. We do not want to create Matadors or even Olympic contestants, but we use sports to test and improve the following characteristics of discipline:

(1) We want to test the bravery, the resoluteness and the boldness of men, and improve it. Therefore, everyone will parachute out of a plane or commit similar daring acts. Everyone will have to dive from a 30 foot board - whether or not he can swim. Everybody will learn how to fence and how to box.

(2) Next we want to know if these men have the will to lead and to rule. All leaders of the party must want to be rulers. We enjoy rule, not to practise despotism or sadistic tyranny, but because we are completely convinced, that in all matters only one man, and we mean only one, can be the responsible ruler. Therefore, they will learn how to ride a horse, to rule a living animal with their iron will."

c. "Whoever rules others, must first learn to rule himself. Therefore, we shall have strict tests in will power, for example no smoking or drinking for a week."

d. "Naturally we will also teach the functional matters necessary for everyone to be a political leader in any specific field."

e. "The total course will last three years. Each separate year will be spent at a different castle to broaden knowledge of people and country. After that each student will spend six months at the Marionburg in East Prussia and after a few years of practical work, he will sent to a special school for whatever branch he is active in (for instance the "Strength through Joy" school at Erwitte or the German Labor Front, Dept. Army school at Lobeda). Later on he will go to a yearly refresher course at the "Gauburgen," the former Gau schools."

5. The Superman Type.

a. "The secure and self-assured appearance of a young leader is of great importance. These men should be firm, and nothing in the world should make them falter. They must act correctly on the polished floors of high society as well as on the shabby grounds of little huts. We do not want to create conceit, but proud and self-assured bearing. We do not want to live like ascetic monks in these castles but we shall mingle with other people, including the opposite sex."

6. Crime and Punishment.

a. "What I want to make clear above all to future political leaders, students of the Ordensburgen, is this: These men, to whom the NSDAP now gives everything which a real man can hope for from life must realize and keep in the bottom of their hearts that they are now dedicated to the Order for life and death and that they must obey it without question. Obedience has been the pillar on which He-Man institutions have survived for hundreds and for thousands of years."

b. "I want to make it clear: These men, who will have the honor of being the political leaders of Germany and to whom the gate to the highest power and supreme leadership is opening - for these men alone will one day lead Germany - these men must know and realize that from now on there is no road back for them. He who fails or he who would betray the Part of the Leader will be destroyed by this Order. Everyone of us must know and understand that when the Party takes the Brown Shirt away from anybody, the person involved will not only lose the office he holds, but he personally and his family, wife and children, will be destroyed. Such are the hard and inexorable laws of the Order. Every National Socialist leader must know -- I want to hammer this idea into the conscience of all men at the Ordensburgen - that he is climbing a steep grade. You can only walk here if you have a sleepwalker's sure touch. You can only have this assurance if you are inspired by absolute belief in and unshakable loyalty to Adolf Hitler and his Idea."

(Source: First U.S. Army Periodic Report #127).

① 10/19/44

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 18 Oct 44 *
* Init: mac *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 170001A Oct 44
To : 172400A Oct 44

No. 125

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

K-8046 - K-820465 - K-830468. K-870475 - K-880500 - K-900522 - K-915565 -
K-915580 - K-905595 - K-900623 - K-860635 - K-845630 - K-855675 - K-8071 - K-7573 -
K-7074 - K-6775 - K-6577.

b. Units in Contact: See Annex No. 2.

New Identifications: Several PWs captured west of WURSELEN today were identified as members of the 7th, 8th and 9th Co's of 246th Volks (People's) Grenadier Regt, also called "Trier" Regt.

The Regt has 3 Bns, 3 Co's to each Bn, and 70-80 men to each Co. It is made up of stragglers from the Battle of France who were apparently assembled in TRIER. Although information is lacking, this regt has probably been attached to the 246th Div, which has suffered heavy casualties.

VII Corps Front: Several PWs were taken from 73rd Engr Bn, which has had heavy casualties. The CO of the Bn told his men that 500 SS troops and armor were due to arrive in the area F-0433 soon. The 3rd Armed Div identified the 766th GHQ Mtz Arty Brigade, which has one btry of 6 x 75mm AT guns (half-track drawn), 3 btrys of 6 x 75mm AT guns (tractor drawn), and also some 105mm gun howitzers and 150mm howitzers. Both AT guns and heavier weapons are used as artillery.

c. Artillery

Sixty-six (66) shellreps were received during the period.

Fourteen (14) new enemy btry locations were reported.

Twenty-six suspected btry locations.

Our arty fired eighty-six (86) counter-btry missions during the period.

d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

The 2nd Bn of the 156th Pz Gren Regt continues to be unidentified and must be considered as an immediate reserve.

The 9th Pz Div, uncommitted for approximately a week, must still be held as a potential reserve.

L-238

SECRET

The 30th British Corps Intelligence Summary in stating that at least one other formation has followed the 116th Pz Div from the ARNHEM area to AACHEN comments; "which it is cannot be said for certain, though the chances are that it is 9th SS, its inseparable companion - 10th SS - may follow later".

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

Lighter resistance was met by the right unit of the 30th Div in moving to the southwest where the town of RICHTERICH (K-8247) was cleared. Moderate arty was general throughout the Corps sector with heavy mortar fire in the center of the 30th Div front.

This arty and patrols was the only activity reported on the fronts of the 2nd Armd Div and the 29th Div.

Tank activity in small groups in the WURSELEN area was reported late this afternoon and in the early evening. This movement may be related to the reported withdrawal of the 3rd Pz Gren Div from the 1st Inf Div front.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Enemy arty firing lessened during the morning hours to moderate shelling with the bulk falling in the zones of the 29th and 30th Divisions. In the afternoon shelling increased in the 30th Div area. Light, medium and heavy calibers were reported from active btrys generally to the N, E, NE and SE. The largest concentration reported was 80 rounds of 105mm reported in the vicinity of the 118th Arty Bn. Most shelling, however, was reported in the forward areas.

The 66th Armd Regt reported some shelling estimated to be 240mm falling in their area.

(2) Air - The only enemy air activity reported was two Spitfires with British markings which strafed the road in the vicinity of K-805668.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather

Considerable cloudiness with scattered showers throughout the period. Forecast for coming period: Overcast and rain for early morning. Broken clouds with occasional showers for the rest of the period.

b. GAF Order of Battle as of 8th October 1944 (estimated actual strength)

| | SEF | TEF | FB | LRB | Recon |
|------------------------------------|------|-----|----|-----|-------|
| N. Germany (N. of 500) and Denmark | 925 | 490 | 35 | 270 | 115 |
| S. Germany, Austria | 340 | 170 | | | 30 |
| Total | 1265 | 660 | 35 | 270 | 145 |

SECRET

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

- a. To counterattack from the WURSELEN area in a NW or northerly direction.
- b. To counterattack from the area N of GEILENKIRCHEN in SE or SW direction.

The presence of the 116th Pz Div, elements of the 1st SS Div, elements of the 2nd Pz and the 3rd Pz Gren Div (part of it now reported withdrawn from the 1st Div front) in the WURSELEN area is in itself reason to suspect an attack from that vicinity.

The several time reported build-up of tanks and guns in the area N of GEILENKIRCHEN again adds up to a strong reason for suspecting action from that area.

Overcast skies limiting our aerial activity and arty observation would be the enemy's ideal time to attempt to restore his West Wall.

2 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report

Annex #2-Units on Our Front

Michael R. Curran
WASHINGTON PLATT
for Colonel, GSC
G-2

Distribution:

Same as G-2 Periodic Report #124

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 152400 TO 162400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 273.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units or origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|---------------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| 116th Pz | 57 | 60th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| | | 2nd Bn | 2 | " " |
| | | 156th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 45 | " " |
| | | 10th Co | 1 | " " |
| | | 116th Pz Recn Bn | 7 | " " |
| 246th Inf | 12 | 352nd Regt Hq | 2 | 30th Div |
| | | 689th Regt 2nd Bn | 6 | " " |
| | | 13th Co | 2 | " " |
| | | 246th Arty Regt | 2 | " " |
| 49th Inf | 101 | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 86 | 30th Div |
| | | 3rd Bn | 14 | 30th Div & 1104th Engr Gp |
| | | 13th Co | 1 | 30th Div |
| 176th Inf | 4 | 22nd GAF Regt 2nd Bn | 2 | 744th Tk Bn |
| | | 3rd Bn | 1 | 113th Cav Gp |
| | | 6th Obsn & Tng Bn | 1 | " " " |
| ? | | 2nd Landesschuetzen Bn | 84 | 30th Div |
| ? | | 741st GHQ TD Bn | 1 | " " |
| ? | | Stragglers | 14 | " " |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|----------------|------------|
| 29th Div | 0 |
| 30th Div | 265 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 0 |
| 113th Cav Gp | 2 |
| 744th Tk Bn | 2 |
| 1104 Engr G Gp | 4 |
| | <u>273</u> |

The 2 PWs from the 113th Cav Gp and the 2 PWs from the 744th Tk Bn were cleared through 29th Div cage.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 30,033.

IPW TEAM #39

UNITS ON OUR FRONT

From North to South:

176th Div

2 Bns, 22nd Flieger Regt
464 Repl & Tng Bn
159 Repl & Tng Bn
6 Obsn & Tng Bn
6 Engr Repl Bn
176? Rcn Bn "Petersen"
167 Repl & Tng Bn

183rd Inf Div

1st Bn, 351st Regt
NCO Bn Duren
1st Bn, 343rd Regt)
NCO Bn Juelich) may be identical
219th Engr Bn
2nd Bn, 330th Regt

Mobile Regt von Fritschen

Mobile Bns, 503, 504 and 506

246th Inf Div

2nd Bn, 689th Regt
1st Bn, 689th Regt

1st SS Pz Div Adolf Hitler

CT Schmidt)
CT Ring) 1st SS Pz Gren Regt

506th GHQ Tank Bn, 20-30 Mk VI tanks

116th Pz Div

1st Bn, 156th Pz Gren Regt
10th Co, 156th Pz Gren Regt
116th Pz Rcn Bn
675th Pz Rcn Bn
60th Pz Gren Regt

6th Home Guard Regt

2nd Bn (under 352nd Inf Regt)

Battle Group Stach

302 West Bn
1st Bn of 149th Regt

Rest of 149th Regt

In addition, the 7th and 741st GHQ TD Bns and the remnants of 108th Pz Brigade are located opposite 30th U.S. Inf Div.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* * * * *
* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 19 Oct 44 *
* Init: Mal *
* * * * *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 180001A Oct 44
To : 182400A Oct 44

No. 126

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

K8046 - K820465 - K830468. K870475 - K880500 - K900522 - K915565 -
K915580 - K905595 - K900623 - K860635 - K845630 - K855675 - K8071 - K7573 -
K7074 - K6775 - K6577.

b. Units in Contact

There was no basic change in the units contacted along the front, however PWs were taken from three units not previously reported in the Corps zone: the 394 Assault Gun Brigade, with the 3rd Btry reported on the left front of the 30th Div and the 1st and 2nd Btrys located in the WURSELEN area. Each btry is normally equipped with six 75mm and four 105mm SP guns. This brigade arrived on the 12th of October from the STOLBERG area; PWs were also taken from the 1st Btry of the 341st Assault Gun Brigade reportedly organized similarly to the 394; finally the 217 Anti-tank Bn (GHQ) put in an appearance. PWs state there are only two guns left in the Bn; both of the latter units, according to PWs, only recently left AACHEN.

c. Reserves and Other forces Capable of Intervention

A PW taken by the VII Corps stated that he saw 2 Bns of tanks in the woods at K9346. Another PW, captured late in the period, reported that seventy tanks had closed in the general WURSELEN area tonight, coming from the NE. While PW reports, taken individually are not too reliable, yet with the number of panzer units now identified in the area plus the other available and uncommitted divisions that may appear at any time, the presence of 50 to 75 tanks are well within the enemy's capabilities and probable intention.

See Annex #2. Extracts G-2 Estimate No. 33, First United States Army.

d. Artillery

Seventy-three (73) shellreps were received during the period.
Twenty-seven (27) new enemy btry locations were reported.
Fourteen (14) suspected enemy btry locations.
Our arty fired seventy-two (72) counter-btry missions.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

A counterattack with the limited objective of seizing road blocks and the immediate area in the vicinity of K8647 was launched by the enemy with a force of a company of infantry supported by 3 tanks late in the afternoon. This activity was contained. Elsewhere on the 30th Div front moderate arty summarizes the primary enemy actions. Increased patrolling on the left flank was noted. Tanks in small groups continued to move about along the front. The enemy reacted particularly strongly to pressure in WURSELEN with arty, mortar and tank fire.

The 2nd Armored Div and the 29th Inf Div reported moderate arty and normal patrolling. Air OPs reported the movement of small groups of infantry and ammunition cars in the area K937630.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Enemy arty firing was lighter during this period, generally quiet during the night hours, but with moderate shelling during the day in the zones of the 29th, 2nd Armd Div and the 30th Div. Light, medium and a few heavy calibers were reported - all harassing.

(2) Air - From 1800 to 2200, groups of from one to eight enemy aircraft operated over the Corps zone dropping flares and anti-personnel bombs without causing any damage or casualties.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather

Scattered clouds and showers. Forecast for coming period: Clear in early morning. Low broken clouds forming by mid-morning and remaining through the day with light scattered showers.

b. PWs

Cumulative enemy PWs captured up to 142400 by U.S. forces, not including Seventh U.S. Army, 337,803.

An example of what happens to some of the units contacted in the battling since Oct 1st on our front-975 PWs were taken from the 149 Regt of the 49th Div, 353 were taken from the 1st Bn of that Regt.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. To continue limited counterattacks from the WURSELEN area, or to launch a coordinated counterattack with approximately 5 bns of infantry supported by 50 to 60 tanks and heavy arty.

b. To launch a counterattack in the GELLENKIRCHEN area generally south with 3 to 5 bns of infantry and 30 to 50 tanks and heavy arty.

The units currently identified in the areas together with those listed as probable reserves in First Army G-2 Estimate (Annex #2) are fully capable of supplying forces of that size. If a major effort is made, the enemy's recent appreciation of weather will undoubtedly dictate activity in a period of overcast.

3 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report
Annex #2-Extracts from FUSA G-2 Estimate
Annex #3-The German G-2 at Work

Michael A. Cavanaugh
for WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

Distribution:

| | | | |
|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| FUSA (5) | 8th FA Bn | 49th AAA Brig | Arty (2) |
| V Corps (2) | 119th FA Gp (5) | 32nd FA Brig | Combat Observers (6) |
| VII Corps (2) | 228th FA Gp (5) | 426th Med Bn | PI #20 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 113th Cav Gp (4) | 99th Inf Bn | MII #124 |
| 5th Armd Div | 1104th Engr Gp (5) | 8th Corps (British) | IPW #39 |
| 1st Inf Div | 1128th Engr Gp (2) | 30th Corps (British) | Msg Gen (2) |
| 29th Inf Div | 1115th Engr Gp (7) | CG XIX | G-2 File (10) |
| 30th Inf Div | 1142nd Engr Gp (4) | G/S | |
| 2nd Sig Bn | 67th Tactical Ren Gp | G-1 | |
| 743rd Tank Bn | 3252 Sig Serv Co | G-3 | |
| 747th Tank Bn | 12th Army Gp | G-4 | |
| 2nd TD Gp (3) | 21st Army Gp | War Room | |
| 12th AAA Gp | Det ZU, 21st MWU | Engr | |
| 7th Armd Gp | 16th AAA Gp | Sig | |
| 258th FA Gp (4) | 98th Med Gp | Air O | |

The following captured document shows how intelligence is being gathered by the G-2's in divisions opposing us today. Although the enemy's methods are similar to our own, the comments on lack of air reconnaissance and the interrogation of American PW's are of particular interest:

246 Volks Grenadier Division
G-2 Nr 10/44 - Confidential

Div Hq, 27/9/44

SUBJECT: G-2 Operations.

1. The officer in charge of keeping the enemy situation up to date at Division, is the G-2. It is duty to furnish the G-2 at all times a clear and dependable picture of the enemy situation. He has at his disposal, in addition to his clerical personnel, as his assistants two interpreters (officers) for the interrogation of PW's.

2. In order to gain an intelligent picture of the enemy situation, the G-2 principally has the following sources:

a. Messages from his Lower Units.

(1) Immediate messages. Every important observation of the enemy is to be reported to Div at once. In particular the following observations:

(a) Special Surveillance by the Guards: To prevent the loss of any special observations noticed by the guards, an observation record will be kept at each post, into which all special incidents will be entered. This record will be kept in duplicate, so the guards will have a copy at all times and the Div G-2 the other copy for evaluation of the reports.

(b) Reports of Enemy Rcn and Combat Patrols: All actions undertaken by the enemy against our own MIA, to be reported to Div at once by wire and to be followed up with a written report including overlay.

(c) Observation of Enemy Air Activity: Unusual tactics of the enemy air force, as well as every bomb dropped in our own battle sector, parachutists including emergency jumps and all not definitely identified flares in the air are to be reported immediately.

(2) Routine Messages. Hereto the following special orders are issued.

b. PW Statements. Now that the air superiority of the enemy in the West has practically eliminated our own air reconnaissance, the importance of PW statements plays a much more decisive role than heretofore. A skilled interrogation report is often the only source of information about the enemy that extends past the outer area of the MIA into the depth of enemy occupied territories. It is therefore always of paramount importance to make as many PW's as possible and to evacuate them as fast as possible to the G-2 of Div for interrogation. The following applies in particular:

(1) The interrogation of PW's takes place only at Div. Lower units are prohibited from interrogating PW's, as they thereby hamper the possibility of a successful interrogation by the interpreters of Div, who have been especially trained for the job. Practically all English and American PWs render good information, when interrogated by skilled interpreters.

(2) The evacuation of PWs to the Div Coll Pt must be carried out by the troops without delay. For security reasons PWs will never be evacuated to the Div CP.

(3) Prior to the evacuation of PWs to the Div Coll Pt all weapons and personal belongings, except his paybook will be taken from the PW; for example,

pocketknives, all papers, money, etc. All belongings will be placed in individual bags identifying the owner, and turned over to the PW escort. This is of special importance for the evaluation of PW statements (captured documents) etc.

(4) In case of enemy wounded who cannot be evacuated, request an interpreter from G-2 of Div to be sent at once, especially if officers are among the wounded. If immediate evacuation to an aid-station is unavoidable, this will be mentioned in the request, enabling the officer to report to the proper station.

(5) It is strictly prohibited to retain PWs for work.

c. Evaluation of captured material. Captured material of all types, particularly documents will often lead to the most important results of intelligence. Only the skilled eye can decide what is important and what is not important. Small scraps of paper are at times of much more value than maps etc. The rule therefore should be: All captured material will be evacuated to the G-2 of Div at once. Proper evaluation however, can only be effected, if place of capture and by whom are indicated. Bags containing all types of material thrown together in a disorderly fashion and without these markings are practically worthless. Remove all papers from the deal and one of the two identification tags (the other remains with the body) and evacuate them to Div.

d. RCN and combat patrols. In order to gain a clear picture of the enemy, special RCN and combat patrols are sent out by Div on specific reconnaissance missions, for example: To pry into enemy positions and installations to the front of our own MLR, capturing of PWs etc. Upon completion of the mission, a written report including an overlay by the patrol leader will be submitted to the G-2 of Div as quickly as possible.

e. Other intelligence sources for enemy reconnaissance. Other intelligence sources for enemy reconnaissance are the Signal radio-interceptors, the tapping of telephone wires, and the employment of agents and spies commuting between the front lines, who are commandeered by the G-2 of Div, air RCN etc.

3. Men responsible for keeping the enemy situation up to date at regiment and independent battalions are the respective S-2s.

For the Divisional Commander

UNGER

(Source: First US Army Periodic Report #129)

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 162400 TO 172400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 244.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|---------------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| 116th Pz | 12 | 60th Pz Gren Regt 2nd Bn | 5 | 30th Div |
| | | 136th Pz Gren Regt 2nd Bn | 7 | " " |
| 246th Inf | 5 | 689th Regt Medics | 2 | 30th Div |
| | | 246th Arty Regt | 3 | 30th Div |
| 49th Inf | 132 | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 103 | 30th Div & 1104th Engr Gp |
| | | 3rd Bn | 21 | 30th Div |
| | | 13th Co | 8 | " " |
| 183rd Inf | 1 | 351st Regt | 2 | 29th Div |
| ? | | 2nd Landasschuetzen Bn | 67 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Regt v. Fritschen | | |
| | | 506th Mobile Bn | 1 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Regt "Trier" | 5 | " " |
| ? | | Marach Bn "Kuehn" | 16 | " " |
| ? | | Stragglers | 2 | 29th Div |
| | | | 1 | 113th Cav Gp |
| | | | 1 | 949 AAA Bn |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|----------------|------------|
| 29th Div | 4 |
| 30th Div | 203 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 0 |
| 1104th Engr Gp | 35 |
| 113th Cav Gp | 1 |
| 949 AAA Bn | 1 |
| | <u>244</u> |

Included in the count for the 30th Div are 34 PWs taken by the 99th Inf Bn and 4 PWs taken by 1104th Engr Gp. Included in the count for the 30th Div in the report of 17 October are 36 PWs taken by the 99th Inf Bn.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 30,277.

EXTRACTS FROM G-2 ESTIMATE FIRST U.S. ARMY

1. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION

a. General. The enemy has reacted to the larger penetrations of the Siegfried Line north and south of AACHEN and the isolation of AACHEN by assembling at least four of his best mobile divisions for a counteroffensive to restore the West Wall and to expel the invader from German soil. After ten days of piecemeal reinforcements which involved 12 Inf Div, 183 Inf Div, Von FREITSCHEN's Mobile Brigade (503, 504 and 506 Schnelle Abteilungen), and 108 Pz Abteilung, the enemy has drawn from the reserves of his armies at least four of his few remaining counterattack divisions. Successively identified on this front are 116 Pz Div, apparently now divorced from 9 Pz, at least a combat team of 1 SS Pz Div, at least a combat team of 2 Pz in the presence of 304 Pz Gr Regt, and on 15 October 3 Pz Gr Div, represented by 8 Pz Gr Regt and 29 Pz Gr Regt. The enemy's reactions have been characterized by piecemeal counterattacks which were shattered by artillery and air action. His counterattack ordered for 13 October was cancelled shortly before 0900 because the weather was good. On 15 October he recommenced counterattacking with the arrival of bad weather. It is believed he is convinced that he cannot counterattack successfully in weather when fighter-bombers can fly and artillery observation planes afford our artillery superior observation. It is believed that his highest command has yet to learn that its troops cannot counterattack successfully in the face of our vastly superior artillery, TD and other heavy weapon support.

b. Reserves. Although four of the Pz or Pz Gr Divs of first quality have appeared on our front, it is believed that he has available at least five more. These are 9 Pz, now believed reconstituted and divorced from 116 Pz Div, 9 SS, withdrawn from Second British Army front a fortnight ago, 10 SS, 2 SS and 12 SS. 17 SS, Pz Lehr and other ghosts from NORMANDY may be revitalized but are believed to be for the time being out of the picture. Other reserves are the famous COETTERDAEMERUNG wave of the 500 series, the Furlough series, and the slender list of reconstituted divisions from RUSSIA available to the enemy for the Western Front. Reserves left to GERMANY for the Western front are currently viewed as slim until the HUNGARIAN front on AUSTRIA's doorstep is stabilized. The garrisoning of a restive CZECHOSLOVAKIA will contain other reserves. Divisions from NORWAY, FINLAND and GREECE are not currently available, nor can anything substantial be further spared from ITALY.

c. Supply. The current strategic air program bringing colossal concentrations of air power on the RHINELAND cities will isolate the battlefield more swiftly, but as inexorably, as the air program which preceded D-Day. For the moment the enemy supply is normal and adequate and no shortage of ammunition, food and other supplies have influenced the tactical situation. However, this supply situation may be expected to deteriorate. The supply of ammunition for different calibers of captured artillery presents some current difficulty.

10/20/44
90455255
MG
157
2
S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 20 Oct 44 *
* Init: 378 *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 190001A Oct 44
To : 192100A Oct 44

No. 127

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

K8245 - 8346 where our 1104 Engr Gp connects with 119 Inf Regt. This change is mainly in the VII Corps sector. In the XIX Corps sector there has been no change during the period.

b. Defensive Organization

"PWs passing through the Army cage report as follows:

(1) RR bridge between BOURHEIM (F-0157) and KIRCHBERG (F-0356) is mined as well as the entrances on other side.

(2) AT ditch, 600 feet long, 15 feet wide and 9 feet deep runs along the road between HOENGIN (K-925535) and SCHLEIDEN (K-9555).

(3) AT ditch completely encircles the village of LINNICH at K-9765.

(4) T-mines under roads near ALDENHOVEN (K-9856), BOURHEIM (F-0157), HOENGIN (K-925535), KIRCHBERG (F-0356).

(5) The weakest spot in the GEILENKIRCHEN (K-9764) sector is said to be at IMMENDORF (K-9063). It is claimed that there are only field fortifications which have poor communication and no bunkers up to LINNICH (K-9765). There are bunkers in the triangle north of IMMENDORF - PRUMMERN (K-9064) - GEILENKIRCHEN.

(6) Field fortifications and barbed wire emplacements have been built along the ROER River and all bridges across the river have been prepared for demolition." (Source: First U.S. Army G-2 Periodic Report #130).

"There are two pillboxes located at approximately 871637 near the railroad station at GEILENKIRCHEN, Germany; about three pillboxes located at approximately 880635; and about six pillboxes located at approximately 894625 and 894633, along the main road between these two coordinates." (Source: Civilian Report Reliability Unknown).

c. Units in Contact

One unit new to our front was reported by PW identification. This unit was 3rd Panzer Engr Bn, 3rd Pz Gren Div. PW was captured in vicinity EUCHEN K8951. All other units previously reported in contact are still believed to be on our front.

d. Artillery

Forty-five (45) shellreps received during the period.

Fourteen (14) new enemy btry locations reported.

Twenty-seven (27) suspected new enemy btry locations reported.

Our arty fired forty-eight (48) counter-arty missions.

Active position areas of the enemy arty are to NE, E, and SE of Corps sector.

e. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

On the night of 16 Oct 44, an American patrol operating with British 30th Corps picked up a deserter from 9th Pz Div. PW stated he deserted his unit before it was due to pull out two days ago (approx 14 Oct). If this information is correct it would be possible for 9th Pz Div to be available in this area as an enemy reserve.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

a. General Summary

In sector of 1104 Eng Combat Group the enemy retired towards AACHEN as our forces advanced. Only scattered resistance was received from occupied pillboxes. In many instances the pillboxes were unoccupied. Arty fire in this sector consisted of an occasional stray round being fired on forward elements.

In sector of 30th Div the enemy formed up for an attack in vicinity K863470. Force consisted of 4 tanks and about 100 infantry. This force was dispersed by our arty.

On fronts of 29th Inf Div and 2nd Armd Div - reported artillery fire and a few patrols.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Varied during the period from moderate to light. Most of the activity commenced after 0700 hours with the period up to 0700 hours being generally quiet.

(2) Aviation Combat - The 2nd Armd Div at 1025 hours reported 33 ME 109s flying N to NW. They were observed over BEGGENDORF K9060.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather 192000A to 202000A Oct 44.

Broken middle and low clouds tonight with occasional overcast and showers. Middle clouds becoming overcast late tonight and lowering in early morning with continuous rain tomorrow morning and early afternoon. Clouds breaking in late afternoon with occasional showers for remainder of period.

b. The Engineer First U.S. Army reports a new type of improvised drifting river mine comprising a rectangular wooden box with wooden buoyancy frame on top. A second lighter frame and trip wire connects to a firing mechanism. Slight movement of the second frame releases a spring loaded striker. Best method of disposal is gunfire. The mine may be camouflaged with hay or rubbish.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change.

2 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report

Annex #2-Order of Battle

George F. Kraybill
for *George F. Kraybill*
WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

Distributions:

Same as G-2 Periodic Report #126

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 172400 TO 182400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 354.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|---------------|------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------|
| 49th Inf | 34 | 148th Regt 2nd Bn | 3 | 30th Div |
| | | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 31 | " " |
| 116th Pz | 5 | 60th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 3 | 30th Div |
| | | 156th Pz Gren Regt 2nd Bn | 2 | " " |
| 2nd Pz | 2 | 304th Pz Gren Regt 2nd Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| 246th Inf | 22 | 689th Regt 14th Co | 18 | 30th Div |
| | | 404th Regt 13th Co | 1 | " " |
| | | 246th Arty Regt | 3 | " " |
| ? | | 108 Pz Brig | | |
| | | (2108th Pz Gren Bn) | 1 | 30th Div |
| ? | | 394th Assault Gun Brig | 6 | " " |
| ? | | 341st " " " | 3 | " " |
| ? | | 217th Assault Tank Bn | 3 | " " |
| ? | | 306th Inf Repl Bn | 3 | 29th Div |
| ? | | NCO School Dueren | 1 | " " |
| ? | | Regt Trier | 2 | 30th Div |
| ? | | 2nd Landesschuetzen Bn | 12 | " " |
| ? | | Bn Kuehne (Muehs) | 197 | 30th Div & 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | 34th Fort MG Bn | 5 | 30th Div |
| ? | | 4th Police Bn KOELN | 16 | " " |
| ? | | Stragglers | 11 | " " |
| | | | 1 | 29th Div |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|------------------|------------|
| 29th Div | 5 |
| 30th Div | 306 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 0 |
| 1104th Engr C Gp | 43 |
| | <u>354</u> |

Included in the above figure for the 30th Div are 6 PWs from the 99th Inf Bn and 19 PWs from the 1104th Engr C Gp which were cleared through the cage of that unit.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 30,631.

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
O/A Team 11

ORDER OF BATTLE - German Army Opposite XIX Corps - 19 Oct 44

| | Regts | No of Bns (100 men ea) | Remarks |
|------------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|
| 176 | — | 4 1/2 (1800 men) | Adm and Training Staff from Munster Service Command, Cologne area. Composed of odd training Bns and the 22nd GAF (Flieger) Regt. First identified early in September. |
| 183 | 351 343 330 | 5 1/2 (2200 men) | An ex-Russia Div, it is made up largely of new recruits. Over 50% of personnel is Austrian. When it arrived in this sector, the Div was below strength, but MG and HCO Bns have since been added to swell its ranks. Nevertheless, the Division has suffered such severe casualties that it is a mere skeleton of its former self. |
| Mobile Regt von FRITSCHEN | — | 2 1/2 (1000 men) | The von FRITSCHEN Mobile Regt, identified in our sector Oct 8, is a counterattack force composed of 503, 504, and 506 Mob Bns. It operates direct under 81st Corps. |
| 246 | 689 "THIER" | 2 1/2 (1000 men) | When this Division was committed near Aachen on 30 September, it was made up of Polish, GAF, and Navy personnel. Part of Div is trapped in Aachen. Ex-Russia. |
| 12 | 27 89 | 2 1/2 (1000 men) | When the Div arrived in the Aachen area 16 Sept, 1/3 of personnel was Russian veterans and the rest new recruits and reclassified men. |
| MOBILE TROOPS | 60 PGR 156 PGR SS PGR 304 PGR | 5 (2000 men) | Combat Teams of 116 Pz Div, 1 SS Pz Div, and 2 Pz Div, plus 506 Tank Bn, were committed piecemeal on and after 12 October. Their mission has been to counterattack in the Wurselen area and East of Aachen. |

AACHEN GARRISON: 1500 - 2000 troops, under the control of 246 Inf Div, remain trapped in Aachen.

ARMOR: Up to 100 tanks, 20-30 of which are tigers, are believed to be located in the Wurselen area, and north towards Gellankirchen.

RESERVES: 3 Pz Gren Div in immediate reserve. 2 Bns of this Div committed East of Aachen 15 October and subsequently withdrawn.
9 Pz Division unlocated for past week. Last identified fighting in the British sector vic Nijmegen.

⑦ 10/21/44

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 21 Oct 44 *
* Init: 274 *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 200001A Oct 44
To : 202400A Oct 44

No. 128

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

No change in XIX Corps sector during the period. Our 1104th Engr Gp reports enemy front line in their sector to be K804423 - K815458 - K825456 - K855463 where our forces will halt until AACHEN is clear of the enemy.

b. Artillery

Ninety-nine (99) shellreps received during the period.
Twenty-three (23) new enemy btry locations.
Twenty-seven suspected new enemy btry locations.
Forty-six (46) counter-btry missions fired by our arty.
Active enemy btrys were indicated to NE, E and SE of Corps sector. In many instances sound locations indicated single roving guns were used by the enemy.

c. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

First U.S. Army G-2 reports that Engr Bn of 9 Pz Div has been identified on British front and according to PW statement this Bn is attached to 84 Inf Div. First U.S. Army believes the remainder of 9 Pz is also on British front in rear areas regrouping. This may be true. However a PW stated that 116 Pz Div was to be relieved by 9 Pz Div. Movement of enemy troops after dark in WURSELEN area may indicate a switch of troops on our front and 9 Pz may still be considered for this area.

The 3rd Pz Gren Div has not been identified on VII Corps for two days. This division is available as an immediate reserve for attack in our sector.

Information on strategic reserves - see Annex #2.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

a. General Summary

The 1104th Engr Gp reports enemy resistance consisted of small arms fire, mortar fire and arty fire in vicinity of WILDBACK K8245 and along ridge NW of AACHEN.

The remainder of our front was relatively quiet except for arty fire and the usual amount of enemy patrolling.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Heavy throughout daylight hours with the bulk of fires being harassing in vicinity of forward elements. In general the concentration fired by enemy were small except for one concentration of sixty rounds of light caliber arty. The enemy reacted with his defensive fires when our arty fired some smoke shells on the enemy positions.

(2) Aviation Combat - At 0300 hours an enemy plane dropped propaganda leaflets in area K879544.

(3) Tanks - The 2nd Armd Div reported that their air OP saw 10-15 tanks at K960585.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Enemy propaganda leaflets dropped in sector of 30th Inf Div indicates the enemy has considerable knowledge of our situation. An extract from this leaflet is as follows: "9th Army under General Simpson to relieve you on the 20th and 21st of October." This is a definite indication that we need to tighten up on our security control. Signal security is of great importance and we must guard our conversations on the telephone if we are not going to furnish vital information to the enemy.

b. Weather 202000A - 212000A Oct 4/44.

Low overcast with light intermittent rain tonight and early tomorrow morning. Clouds then breaking somewhat and remaining broken to overcast remainder of period with scattered showers.

c. Civilian Report Reliability Unknown

Interrogation of a former civilian secretary to the CO of the 306 Repl & Tng Bn, currently fighting N of GETLENKIRCHEN, reveals the following information on reserves in Germany:

306 Bn, as part of 211 Tng & Repl Regt, formerly furnished replacements for the 95th Inf Div engaged on the northern Russian front. Towards the end of July 44, the Div, after suffering heavy losses, was withdrawn and sent to Denmark with remnants of 3-4000 men. As the Div was furnished an average draft of 1000 men per month by the 211 Regt, it can be assumed that the refitting process has been completed by now, and the Div must therefore be regarded as reserve available in Germany. If strength is the same as that of other recently reformed divs, it will approximately be 8000 men.

Same informant also stated that 2nd Para Div was reforming in Koln-Wahn (8 miles SW Koln), with a cadre of officers and NCOs that returned from Brest in August.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. The enemy is capable of attacking our forces with 116 Pz Div, 183 Inf Div and 3rd Pz Gren Div in order to seal off our penetration of the Siegfried Line.

b. The enemy is capable of withdrawing the bulk of his forces to the line of the Roer River leaving a covering force on his present positions to hold our forces while he organizes the line of the Roer.

During the period the 30th Div reported considerable enemy movement to NE between HONGEN K9354 and SCHLEIDEN K9555. This may indicate that capability (b) is being placed in effect. However, reports of increased flak to the E, N and NE of the 2nd Armd Div would indicate troop concentrations in this area and the enemy is then capable of placing capability (a) in effect. It is very likely that the enemy may launch one large attack against our forces with the main attack coming in the sector of the 2nd Armd Div. However, it is not possible at present to state which capability the enemy will adopt since we do not have sufficient information on the movements reported by the 30th Inf Div.

3 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report

Annex #2-Enemy Reserves

Annex #3-Germans Compare Russian and US Army.

Distribution:

Same as G-2 Periodic Report #127

George F. Graybill
Major GSC
for WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 182400 TO 192400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 106.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|---------------------------|------------|----------------|
| 116th Pz | 17 | 60th Pz Gren Regt Hq | 4 | 30th Div |
| | | 2nd Bn | 9 | " " |
| | | 116th Pz Ren Bn | 4 | " " |
| 246th Inf | 16 | 246th Arty Regt | 2 | 30th Div |
| | | 246th Engr Bn | 14 | " " |
| 2nd Pz | 8 | 304th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 8 | 30th Div |
| 183rd Inf | 6 | 330th Regt 1st Bn | 2 | 2nd Armad Div |
| | | 343rd Regt 2nd Bn | 1 | " " " |
| | | 13th Co | 2 | " " " |
| | | 219th Arty Regt | 1 | " " " |
| 3rd Pz Gr | 2 | 3rd Engr Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| 49th Inf | 2 | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Bn Kuelme (Muehs) | 29 | 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | 2nd Landesschuetz Bn | 14 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Regt Trier | 1 | " " |
| ? | | Battle Group TIEFENTHAL | 6 | " " |
| ? | | Stragglers | 2 | " " |
| | | | 3 | 2nd Armad Div |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|------------------|------------|
| 29th Div | 0 |
| 30th Div | 68 |
| 2nd Armad Div | 9 |
| 1104th Engr G Gp | 29 |
| | <u>106</u> |

Included in the figures for the 30th Div are 8 PWs from the 99th Inf Bn which were cleared through the cage of the former unit.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 30,737.

ENEMY RESERVES

"The following view on the availability of enemy reserves is taken by 12 Army Groups:

"It appears that the flow of rested and refitted divisions and GOTTERDAEMERUNG divisions to the West has temporarily stopped and the only new division to appear during the past week is the 416 Infantry Division from DENMARK. Further, if a supply of new divisions were available to the West it is unlikely that there would be as active shifting of divisions up and down the line to danger points with the resultant heavy expenditure of gasoline and additional maintenance. Possibly every unit that was even moderately well trained and equipped was rushed to the front during September; possibly the known shortage in small arms and other equipment is slowing down the program; possibly the demands for reinforcements on the Eastern front are so pressing that they are being given priority over the requests from the West. Whatever the true reason may be, the added strength is not appearing and the enemy must therefore shift his forces as best he can from one danger point to another. The METZ area apparently was regarded as the most dangerous a few weeks ago and forces moved to that area. The British attack in the North produced a new danger point and forces were sent there from GERMANY and First US Army front. The AACHEN attack is the third dangerous development but since no more strength came from GERMANY, it was necessary to draw from the line in the North and South in this instance. If the attack is pressed, this shifting process may be expected to continue and it is not unlikely that the Southern sector will furnish additional reinforcements to the North.

"The enemy is continuing to play for time in which to prepare defenses, rebuild his armored forces and replenish his air force. It is evident that in air power he has made substantial progress and the lack of identification of several Panzer divisions for a long period indicates that he still intends to build a mobile counterattacking force as a strategic reserve. Possibly he might supplement this, if our pressure permits, by replacing some of the armor in the line with infantry and gathering also an immediate tactical reserve. Present organization points to an enemy intention of stubborn defenses to gain time and in the short period of comparative quiet that occurred in September the Germans have shown a surprising power of recuperation. The enemy has also shown an ability to move forces promptly to a threatened point and to make excellent use of limited forces in well-prepared positions.

"There is no evidence, however, that the fundamental position and strength of the enemy has gained or that he has the power to hold if coordinated attacks are directed simultaneously at several points. Time appears to be on the side of the enemy for the reforming of his ground, armored and air forces during the next few months but the passage of time should also be on the side of the Allies in building up supplies and in revealing the fundamental shortages of GERMANY in manpower, oil and essential metals."

(Source: First U.S. Army G-2 Periodic Report #131)

"GERMANS COMPARE RUSSIAN AND U.S. ARMY"

(A Survey conducted in answer to question in Memorandum from Twelfth Army Group, 23 Sep 44)

PWs questioned had seen active service on both the East as well as the West front. Altogether 360 PWs were interrogated.

General: Said a S/Sgt from the 17 Pz Div (employed in Russia), later transferred to 33 MI Bn: "What the Russian won't let you forget for one minute when you fight him is the fact that you are fighting on his soil, that you represent something to him that he loathes, that you are an intruder. He cares little for his life if he knows that he is pushing you back. He will endure the greatest cold, the meagerest ration, the worst hardships - if the situation so demands. True, the average soldier lacks the degree of resourcefulness of, for example, the American, but he makes up for it by a steadfastness that I have never experienced anywhere else. If 9 men get killed in the attempt of, say, cutting a wire, the 10th will still try again - and succeed."

"You Americans are masters of your equipment - and your equipment is plenty good. You are better as individual fighters than the Russian but you lack his tenacity. Your strongest point is, I believe, a minute coordination between all your weapons."

The Infantry: The Russian infantry, which deserves a great deal of the credit can attribute their success to the following qualities. The Russian infantry men, so the Germans say, is a practical adherer to the principle of "Kill or get killed". Niceties of a "gentlemen warfare" wouldn't even enter into the head of the Russian doughboy. When he gets a command, he'll attempt to execute it, no matter how difficult; he is reported to have stayed in a certain position for hours at a time in order to stalk his prey, even in Arctic temperature. His equipment is light, he's never overloaded and can move easily through the terrain. As a matter of fact, the Germans say he's unsurpassed in terrain deployment, camouflage, and digging in. Another score on which the Germans fear the Russian is his ability to fight at night and during fog, times in which he can especially display his skill in bayonet and close-combat fighting. - Examples which show how dangerous the Russian infantryman is were cited by German PWs:

"I saw it happen time and again that even severely wounded soldiers got up and continued fighting."

"We (the 261 Inf Div) were being shelled by the Russian Arty; we waited for a lull in which the infantry would attack then we perceived too late that the infantry had advanced into their own Arty fire."

"The Russians always attack in mass. This mass I saw advance with some men who presumably had lost their weapons. They advanced just the same, picking up guns from men who had been hit."

"Many a time the Russians attacked across an open field without protection, cover or concealment."

Other characteristics of the Russian infantry are its well trained snipers and mortar crews, its RGN units which are said to be excellent, and the frugality of its soldiers.

Weaknesses which the Germans have noticed are few, but must be taken in consideration. "It is hard to get the Russians to run, but once they are on the run, they don't stop for quite a while." As an individual fighter he's not very resourceful and often is too reckless where by ingenuity he could be more successful. He is not too able to keep his open order formations. And lastly, at times, or so at least the Germans say, they are not sufficiently motorized. The American infantryman is resourceful and has initiative. This, together with his carbine and M-1, make him a formidable opponent. The Infantry also receives a well time support of other weapons such as Airforce and Arty. Germans maintain that our infantry is determined to save lives. They are, therefore, cautious; perhaps, one if argues, too cautious. The same informant also mentions bunching up and loudness (a weakness from which the Russians are not free either) as our principal faults. Many PWs accorded us the doubtful compliment that we are "fair fighters". It is problematical whether this characterization should be preferred over the evaluation on the Russians "who don't care how they do it".

The Arty: The Russians, according to the laments of the Germans, are masters of the

mortar, a weapon which may be termed their principal support weapon. There is a mortar in practically every squad. The Russians have a technique of coupling mortars, outside of their numerous other multiple discharge high trajectory weapons. Amongst these is a weapon which the Germans call "Stalinorgel", which even when not taking its toll in dead and wounded has a tremendous effect on the German morale. What has previously been said about the Russian infantry also applies to the Arty, which is to say that they understand how to camouflage their pieces and to give them natural protection. The Russian tactic of massing their Arty fire on one point has shown good results.

Weak spots of the Russian Arty are said to be insufficient liaison between Arty and Airforce. And though the mortars are uncannily precise, the Arty pieces proper have not been able to match this marksmanship. About the effect, PWs comment, that there are a great many duds and that shells often hit too deep, which - especially on soft ground terrain - impedes the effectiveness. One PW mentions that Russians are not fast enough in moving their Arty in a retreat, thus losing too many weapons. The Russian AAA is accurate, according to a German "Luftwaffe" member, formerly active over the East front. U.S. Arty, as well as the Russian, commands ample ammunition which they use on steady barrages. U.S. fire, PWs claim, is precise; the pieces are mobile, observation perfect. The only criticism, PWs offered is that in some rare cases camouflage is insufficient. Otherwise, a PW from the 20 Fortress Bn sums the situation pretty well. "Weaknesses? If your Arty has any, I haven't noticed it."

Tanks: The Russians have found an excellent tank in their model T-34. It is a low built and very fast tank. It is the most frequently used tank - and the Russians have always had plenty of them. The mobility of Russian tanks is not impeded by its heavy armor, the mass of heavy ammunition carried and heavy tank-mounted weapons among which the 15 cm cannon is, according to PWs, the most effective. Russian tank crews are well trained and know how to deploy their tanks in the terrain. The heavier tanks (KW 1 and KW 2) are frequently dug in. Here too, the Russians are able to use their tanks to best advantage. Russian tanks afford poor visibility. This weakness was brought up by several PWs. Lack of an inter-tank signal system was also mentioned as a Russian weakness, because it has frequently happened that the coordination of a tank attack was broken by the expedient of destroying the command tank. American tanks stand up better under AT fire than Russian.

The strong points of American tanks in the minds of the PWs is the comparatively quiet movement, in contrast to the Russian tanks which are very noisy. Fire power, good visibility, and good armor also are qualities of our tanks. And our signal communication appears to PWs to be adequate. On the other hand it was learned that through lack of dispersal tanks form too big a target for German Arty.

Airforce: "American and British planes are the best in the world." And the Germans have a healthy respect for our bombing and strafing technique. As the Russians use, to a great extent, our planes and instruments, the above statements also apply to the Russians, with the following two exceptions:

1. The Russian made planes are not quite up to par with ours.
2. Pilots do not have as extensive a training as U.S. fliers.

Comparing Tactics:

a) Infantry: 1. The Russian infantry, in contrast to ours, precedes the tanks. It is usually a mass attack. Russians attack with fanatical eagerness and with complete disregard for losses.

PWs comment:

"If you got the manpower, like the Russians have, you'll succeed with this method."

2. PWs state that while U.S. forces are always sufficiently motorized, Russians fail to get vehicles for a pursuit.

PW comment:

"When we retreat, we are loaded on trucks. If the Russians would follow suit, they would have been able to cut us off many a time."

3. The Russian sniper is one of the best in the world. Germans say that he often uses women, as a matter of fact some times retire women Bns for this job.

PWs comment:

"Mit denen ist man seines Lebens nie sicher" (Those snipers threaten one's life at all times)

4. Russians are masters of entrenchments. They often build underground bunkers so well camouflaged that enemies walk over them without noticing them. Russians then attack from the rear.

PWs comment:

PWs comment:

"It's impossible to detect them."

5. Retreat of infantry is covered by mortars, also arty pieces.

6. Russians, as is well known, use a scorched earth policy when retreating and that means they leave nothing behind. All people, except the aged, are evacuated.

7. Infantry often advances on top of the tanks, clinging to whatever they can.

PWs comment: "I'd hate to be sitting on top of those tanks."

b) Tanks: 1. Russians usually operate with the T-34. Attacks are launched in waves. One wave advances, stops, and the next wave advances past the stopping point of the first wave. Thus 3-4 overlapping echelons are created.

2. Tanks, after having broken through, do not go ahead, but help infantry to roll up flanks. This appears to be the main difference between U.S. and Russian tank tactics.

3. Tanks attack in mass-formation behind the infantry.

4. If AT fire becomes too strong, tanks are withdrawn and then either employed again at a weaker point or 2-4 tanks or RCM cars are sent once more against position to draw AT fire. Location of AT-Btry is then computed and knocked out by Arty barrages or mortar fire ("Stalinorgel" is frequently used for this purpose).

5. Often wooden tanks are used as decoys; these decoys can easily be spotted. If Germans then advance, thinking that they are only facing wooden tanks, they soon find that they have walked into a trap - for the real tanks were hidden at the flanks of the dummies.

c) Mines: 1. The Russians use mines and booby traps extensively, with pressure-release types in the majority. Russians are very ingenious in the use of these weapons and can improvise booby traps out of the most primitive material.

2. The mine which the Germans fear most is the so-called "Kindersarg" (Baby Coffin). This is a wooden box filled with TNT. It is a pressure release type - and due to its wooden casing cannot be found by mine detectors.

3. Russian mine detectors are termed as excellent by PWs.

d) Guerilla Tactics: Russian Guerillas were greatly responsible for making the German supply lines collapse. Often men are dropped behind German lines by parachute or sometimes whole Bns infiltrate. They are very fast, well trained and almost impossible to find in the large Russian woods. Whole German divisions were frequently pinned down in order to combat these guerillas, mostly without success. Women are also used as guerillas.

Sidelights on Survey: When PWs were screened for survey, their first reaction was one of terror. They feared that they would be sent to a PW camp in Russia. When told that this was not the case, PWs started to indulge in some wishful thinking along the Goebbels Propaganda lines of dividing Western and Eastern Allies.

And as a summary it may be said that PWs have a great deal of respect for the Allied soldiers.

(Source: First U.S. Army Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports 19 Oct 1944)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 21 Oct 44 *
* Init: 174 *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 200001A Oct 44
To : 202400A Oct 44

No. 128

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

No change in XIX Corps sector during the period. Our 1104th Engr Gp reports enemy front line in their sector to be K804423 - K815458 - K825456 - K855463 where our forces will halt until AACHEN is clear of the enemy.

b. Artillery

Ninety-nine (99) shellreps received during the period.
Twenty-three (23) new enemy btry locations.
Twenty-seven suspected new enemy btry locations.
Forty-six (46) counter-btry missions fired by our arty.
Active enemy btrys were indicated to NE, E and SE of Corps sector. In many instances sound locations indicated single roving guns were used by the enemy.

c. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

First U.S. Army G-2 reports that Engr Bn of 9 Pz Div has been identified on British front and according to PW statement this Bn is attached to 84 Inf Div. First U.S. Army believes the remainder of 9 Pz is also on British front in rear areas re-grouping. This may be true. However a PW stated that 116 Pz Div was to be relieved by 9 Pz Div. Movement of enemy troops after dark in WURSELEN area may indicate a switch of troops on our front and 9 Pz may still be considered for this area.

The 3rd Pz Gren Div has not been identified on VII Corps for two days. This division is available as an immediate reserve for attack in our sector.

Information on strategic reserves - see Annex #2.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

a. General Summary

The 1104th Engr Gp reports enemy resistance consisted of small arms fire, mortar fire and arty fire in vicinity of WILDBACK K8245 and along ridge NW of AACHEN.

The remainder of our front was relatively quiet except for arty fire and the usual amount of enemy patrolling.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Heavy throughout daylight hours with the bulk of fires being harassing in vicinity of forward elements. In general the concentration fired by enemy were small except for one concentration of sixty rounds of light caliber arty. The enemy reacted with his defensive fires when our arty fired some smoke shells on the enemy positions.

(2) Aviation Combat - At 0300 hours an enemy plane dropped propaganda leaflets in area K879544.

(3) Tanks - The 2nd Arm Div reported that their air OP saw 10-15 tanks at K960585.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Enemy propaganda leaflets dropped in sector of 30th Inf Div indicates the enemy has considerable knowledge of our situation. An extract from this leaflet is as follows: "9th Army under General Simpson to relieve you on the 20th and 21st of October." This is a definite indication that we need to tighten up on our security control. Signal security is of great importance and we must guard our conversations on the telephone if we are not going to furnish vital information to the enemy.

b. Weather 202000A - 212000A Oct 44.

Low overcast with light intermittent rain tonight and early tomorrow morning. Clouds then breaking somewhat and remaining broken to overcast remainder of period with scattered showers.

c. Civilian Report Reliability Unknown

Interrogation of a former civilian secretary to the CO of the 306 Repl & Tng Bn, currently fighting N of GEILENKIRCHEN, reveals the following information on reserves in Germany:

306 Bn, as part of 211 Tng & Repl Regt, formerly furnished replacements for the 95th Inf Div engaged on the northern Russian front. Towards the end of July 44, the Div, after suffering heavy losses, was withdrawn and sent to Denmark with remnants of 3-4000 men. As the Div was furnished an average draft of 1000 men per month by the 211 Regt, it can be assumed that the refitting process has been completed by now, and the Div must therefore be regarded as reserve available in Germany. If strength is the same as that of other recently reformed divs, it will approximately be 8000 men.

Same informant also stated that 2nd Para Div was reforming in Koln-Wahn (8 miles SW Koln), with a cadre of officers and NCOs that returned from Brest in August.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. The enemy is capable of attacking our forces with 116 Pz Div, 183 Inf Div and 3rd Pz Gren Div in order to seal off our penetration of the Siegfried Line.

b. The enemy is capable of withdrawing the bulk of his forces to the line of the Roer River leaving a covering force on his present positions to hold our forces while he organizes the line of the Roer.

During the period the 30th Div reported considerable enemy movement to NE between HONGEN K9354 and SCHLEIDEN K9555. This may indicate that capability (b) is being placed in effect. However, reports of increased flak to the E, N and NE of the 2nd Armd Div would indicate troop concentrations in this area and the enemy is then capable of placing capability (a) in effect. It is very likely that the enemy may launch one large attack against our forces with the main attack coming in the sector of the 2nd Armd Div. However, it is not possible at present to state which capability the enemy will adopt since we do not have sufficient information on the movements reported by the 30th Inf Div.

3 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report

Annex #2-Enemy Reserves

Annex #3-Germans Compare Russian and US Army.

Distribution:

Same as G-2 Periodic Report #127

George F. Haybill
Major GSC
for WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 182400 TO 192400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 106.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|---------------------------|------------|----------------|
| 116th Pz | 17 | 60th Pz Gren Regt Hq | 4 | 30th Div |
| | | 2nd Bn | 9 | " " |
| | | 116th Pz Rcn Bn | 4 | " " |
| 246th Inf | 16 | 246th Arty Regt | 2 | 30th Div |
| | | 246th Engr Bn | 14 | " " |
| 2nd Pz | 8 | 304th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 8 | 30th Div |
| 183rd Inf | 6 | 330th Regt 1st Bn | 2 | 2nd Armd Div |
| | | 343rd Regt 2nd Bn | 1 | " " " |
| | | 13th Co | 2 | " " " |
| | | 219th Arty Regt | 1 | " " " |
| 3rd Pz Gr | 2 | 3rd Engr Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| 49th Inf | 2 | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Bn Kuehne (Muehs) | 29 | 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | 2nd Landesschuetz Bn | 14 | 30th Div |
| ? | | Regt Trier | 1 | " " |
| ? | | Battle Group TIEFENTHAL | 6 | " " |
| ? | | Stragglers | 2 | " " |
| | | | 3 | 2nd Armd Div |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|------------------|------------|
| 29th Div | 0 |
| 30th Div | 68 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 9 |
| 1104th Engr G Gp | 29 |
| | <u>106</u> |

Included in the figure for the 30th Div are 8 PWs from the 99th Inf Bn which were cleared through the cage of the former unit.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 30,737.

ENEMY RESERVES

"The following view on the availability of enemy reserves is taken by 12 Army Group:

"It appears that the flow of rested and refitted divisions and GOTTERDAEMERUNG divisions to the West has temporarily stopped and the only new division to appear during the past week is the 416 Infantry Division from DENMARK. Further, if a supply of new divisions were available to the West it is unlikely that there would be as active shifting of divisions up and down the line to danger points with the resultant heavy expenditure of gasoline and additional maintenance. Possibly every unit that was even moderately well trained and equipped was rushed to the front during September, possibly the known shortage in small arms and other equipment is slowing down the program; possibly the demands for reinforcements on the Eastern front are so pressing that they are being given priority over the requests from the West. Whatever the true reason may be, the added strength is not appearing and the enemy must therefore shift his forces as best he can from one danger point to another. The METZ area apparently was regarded as the most dangerous a few weeks ago and forces moved to that area. The British attack in the North produced a new danger point and forces were sent there from GERMANY and First US Army front. The AACHEN attack is the third dangerous development but since no more strength came from GERMANY, it was necessary to draw from the line in the North and South in this instance. If the attack is pressed, this shifting process may be expected to continue and it is not unlikely that the Southern sector will furnish additional reinforcements to the North.

"The enemy is continuing to play for time in which to prepare defenses, rebuild his armored forces and replenish his air force. It is evident that in air power he has made substantial progress and the lack of identification of several Panzer divisions for a long period indicates that he still intends to build a mobile counterattacking force as a strategic reserve. Possibly he might supplement this, if our pressure permits, by replacing some of the armor in the line with infantry and gathering also an immediate tactical reserve. Present organization points to an enemy intention of stubborn defense to gain time and in the short period of comparative quiet that occurred in September the Germans have shown a surprising power of recuperation. The enemy has also shown an ability to move forces promptly to a threatened point and to make excellent use of limited forces in well-prepared positions.

"There is no evidence, however, that the fundamental position and strength of the enemy has gained or that he has the power to hold if coordinated attacks are directed simultaneously at several points. Time appears to be on the side of the enemy for the reforming of his ground, armored and air forces during the next few months but the passage of time should also be on the side of the Allies in building up supplies and in revealing the fundamental shortages of GERMANY in manpower, oil and essential metals."

(Source: First U.S. Army G-2 Periodic Report #131)

"GERMANS COMPARE RUSSIAN AND U.S. ARMY"

(A Survey conducted in answer to question in Memorandum from Twelfth Army Group, 23 Sep 44)

PWs questioned had seen active service on both the East as well as the West front. Altogether 360 PWs were interrogated.

General: Said a S/Sgt from the 17 Pz Div (employed in Russia), later transferred to 33 MG Bn: "What the Russian won't let you forget for one minute when you fight him is the fact that you are fighting on his soil, that you represent something to him that he loathes, that you are an intruder. He cares little for his life if he knows that he is pushing you back. He will endure the greatest cold, the meagerest ration, the worst hardships - if the situation so demands. True, the average soldier lacks the degree of resourcefulness of, for example, the American, but he makes up for it by a steadfastness that I have never experienced anywhere else. If 9 men get killed in the attempt of, say, cutting a wire, the 10th will still try again - and succeed."

"You Americans are masters of your equipment - and your equipment is plenty good. You are better as individual fighters than the Russian but you lack his tenacity. Your strongest point is, I believe, a minute coordination between all your weapons."

The Infantry: The Russian infantry, which deserves a great deal of the credit can attribute their success to the following qualities. The Russian infantry man, so the Germans say, is a practical adherer to the principle of "Kill or get killed". Niceties of a "gentlemen warfare" wouldn't even enter into the head of the Russian doughboy. When he gets a command, he'll attempt to execute it, no matter how difficult; he is reported to have stayed in a certain position for hours at a time in order to stalk his prey, even in Arctic temperature. His equipment is light, he's never overloaded and can move easily through the terrain. As a matter of fact, the Germans say he's unsurpassed in terrain deployment, camouflage, and digging in. Another score on which the Germans fear the Russian is his ability to fight at night and during fog, times in which he can especially display his skill in bayonet and close-combat fighting. - Examples which show how dangerous the Russian infantryman is were cited by German PWs:

"I saw it happen time and again that even severely wounded soldiers got up and continued fighting."

"We (the 261 Inf Div) were being shelled by the Russian Arty; we waited for a lull in which the infantry would attack then we perceived too late that the infantry had advanced into their own Arty fire."

"The Russians always attack in mass. This mass I saw advance with some men who presumably had lost their weapons. They advanced just the same, picking up guns from men who had been hit."

"Many a time the Russians attacked across an open field without protection, cover or concealment."

Other characteristics of the Russian infantry are its well trained snipers and mortar crews, its RCN units which are said to be excellent, and the frugality of its soldiers.

Weaknesses which the Germans have noticed are few, but must be taken in consideration. "It is hard to get the Russians to run, but once they are on the run, they don't stop for quite a while." As an individual fighter he's not very resourceful and often is too reckless where by ingenuity he could be more successful. He is not too able to keep his open order formations. And lastly, at times, or so at least the Germans say, they are not sufficiently motorized. The American infantry man is resourceful and has initiative. This, together with his carbine and M-1, make him a formidable opponent. The Infantry also receives a well time support of other weapons such as Airforce and Arty. Germans maintain that our infantry is determined to save lives. They are, therefore, cautious; perhaps, one it argues, too cautious. The same informant also mentions bunching up and loudness (a weakness from which the Russians are not free either) as our principal faults. Many PWs accorded us the doubtful compliment that we are "fair fighters". It is problematical whether this characterization should be preferred over the evaluation on the Russians "who don't care how they do it".

The Arty: The Russians, according to the laments of the Germans, are masters of the

mortar, a weapon which may be termed their principal support weapon. There is a mortar in practically every squad. The Russians have a technique of coupling mortars, outside of their numerous other multiple discharge high trajectory weapons. Amongst these is a weapon which the Germans call "Stalinorgel", which even when not taking its toll in dead and wounded has a tremendous effect on the German morale. What has previously been said about the Russian infantry also applies to the Arty, which is to say that they understand how to camouflage their pieces and to give them natural protection. The Russian tactic of massing their Arty fire on one point has shown good results.

Weak spots of the Russian Arty are said to be insufficient liaison between Arty and Airforce. And though the mortars are uncannily precise, the Arty pieces proper have not been able to match this marksmanship. About the effect, PWs comment, that there are a great many duds and that shells often hit too deep, which - especially on soft ground terrain - impedes the effectiveness. One PW mentions that Russians are not fast enough in moving their Arty in a retreat, thus losing too many weapons. The Russian AAA is accurate, according to a German "Luftwaffe" member, formerly active over the East front. U.S. Arty, as well as the Russian, commands ample ammunition which they use on steady barrages. U.S. fire, PWs claim, is precise; the pieces are mobile, observation perfect. The only criticism, PWs offered is that in some rare cases camouflage is insufficient. Otherwise, a PW from the 20 Fortress Bn sums the situation pretty well. "Weaknesses? If your Arty has any, I haven't noticed it."

Tanks: The Russians have found an excellent tank in their model T-34. It is a low built and very fast tank. It is the most frequently used tank - and the Russians have always had plenty of them. The mobility of Russian tanks is not impeded by its heavy armor, the mass of heavy ammunition carried and heavy tank-mounted weapons among which the 15 cm cannon is, according to PWs, the most effective. Russian tank crews are well trained and know how to deploy their tanks in the terrain. The heavier tanks (KV 1 and KV 2) are frequently dug in. Here too, the Russians are able to use their tanks to best advantage. Russian tanks afford poor visibility. This weakness was brought up by several PWs. Lack of an inter-tank signal system was also mentioned as a Russian weakness, because it has frequently happened that the coordination of a tank attack was broken by the expedient of destroying the command tank. American tanks stand up better under AT fire than Russian.

The strong points of American tanks in the minds of the PWs is the comparatively quiet movement, in contrast to the Russian tanks which are very noisy. Fire power, good visibility, and good armor also are qualities of our tanks. And our signal communication appears to PWs to be adequate. On the other hand it was learned that through lack of dispersal tanks form too big a target for German Arty.

Airforce: "American and British planes are the best in the world." And the Germans have a healthy respect for our bombing and strafing technique. As the Russians use, to a great extent, our planes and instruments, the above statements also apply to the Russians, with the following two exceptions:

1. The Russian made planes are not quite up to par with ours.
2. Pilots do not have as extensive a training as U.S. fliers.

Comparing Tactics:

a) Infantry: 1. The Russian infantry, in contrast to ours, precedes the tanks. It is usually a mass attack. Russians attack with fanatical eagerness and with complete disregard for losses.

PWs comment:

"If you got the manpower, like the Russians have, you'll succeed with this method."

2. PWs state that while U.S. forces are always sufficiently motorized, Russians fail to get vehicles for a pursuit.

PW comment:

"When we retreat, we are loaded on trucks. If the Russians would follow suit, they would have been able to cut us off many a time."

3. The Russian sniper is one of the best in the world. Germans say that he often uses women, as a matter of fact some times retire women Bns for this job.

PWs comment:

"Mit denen ist man seines Lebens nie sicher" (Those snipers threaten one's life at all times)

4. Russians are masters of entrenchments. They often build underground bunkers so well camouflaged that enemies walk over them without noticing them. Russians then attack from the rear.

PWs comment:

PWs comment:

"It's impossible to detect them."

5. Retreat of infantry is covered by mortars, also Arty pieces.

6. Russians, as is well known, use a scorched earth policy when retreating and that means they leave nothing behind. All people, except the aged, are evacuated.

7. Infantry often advances on top of the tanks, clinging to whatever they can.

PWs comment: "I'd hate to be sitting on top of those tanks."

b) Tanks: 1. Russians usually operate with the T-34. Attacks are launched in waves. One wave advances, stops, and the next wave advances past the stopping point of the first wave. Thus 3-4 overlapping echelons are created.

2. Tanks, after having broken through, do not go ahead, but help infantry to roll up flanks. This appears to be the main difference between U.S. and Russian tank tactics.

3. Tanks attack in mass-formation behind the infantry.

4. If AT fire becomes too strong, tanks are withdrawn and then either employed again at a weaker point or 2-4 tanks or RCN cars are sent once more against position to draw AT fire. Location of AT-Btry is then computed and knocked out by Arty barrages or mortar fire ("Stalinorgel" is frequently used for this purpose).

5. Often wooden tanks are used as decoys; these decoys can easily be spotted. If Germans then advance, thinking that they are only facing wooden tanks, they soon find that they have walked into a trap - for the real tanks were hidden at the flanks of the dummies.

c) Mines: 1. The Russians use mines and booby traps extensively, with pressure-release types in the majority. Russians are very ingenious in the use of these weapons and can improvise booby traps out of the most primitive material.

2. The mine which the Germans fear most is the so-called "Kindersarg" (Baby Coffin). This is a wooden box filled with TNT. It is a pressure release type - and due to its wooden casing cannot be found by mine detectors.

3. Russian mine detectors are termed as excellent by PWs.

d) Guerilla Tactics: Russian Guerillas were greatly responsible for making the German supply lines collapse. Often men are dropped behind German lines by parachute or sometimes whole Bns infiltrate. They are very fast, well trained and almost impossible to find in the large Russian woods. Whole German divisions were frequently pinned down in order to combat these guerillas, mostly without success. Women are also used as guerillas.

Sidelights on Survey: When PWs were screened for survey, their first reaction was one of terror. They feared that they would be sent to a PW camp in Russia. When told that this was not the case, PWs started to indulge in some wishful thinking along the Goebbels Propaganda lines of dividing Western and Eastern Allies.

And as a summary it may be said that PWs have a great deal of respect for the Allied soldiers.

(Source: First U.S. Army Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports 19 Oct 1944)

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 22 Oct 44 *
* Init: 87A *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 210001A Oct 44
To : 212400A Oct 44

No. 129

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

No change during the period.

b. Defensive Organization

PW information indicates that the tank ditches NW of DUREN and along ROER River all reinforced with lumber and brush. At irregular distances MG emplacements are connected with the trenches.

c. Units in Contact (new identifications underlined>

176th Division

Sector Susteren-Breberen-Waldenrath

306 Repl & Tng Bn

464 Repl & Tng Bn

6 Arty Obse Repl & Tng Bn

159 Repl & Tng Bn

167 Repl & Tng Bn

6 Engr Repl & Tng Bn

183rd Division

Sector Waldenrath-Geilenkirchen-Schaufenberg

1st Bn, 351 Inf Regt

1st Bn, 343 Inf Regt

NCO Bn DUREN

NCO Bn JULICH

1st Bn, 330 Inf Regt

771 Home Guard Bn

54 MG Bn

219 AT Bn (in support)

Mobile Regt v FRITSCHEN

Sector Schaufenberg-Euchen

504 Mobile Bn

503 Mobile Bn

506 Mobile Bn

Units in Sector Wurselen-Aachen

3rd Pz Gren Div

1st & 3rd Bns, 8 Pz Gr Regt

3rd Pz Engr Bn

116 Pz Div

Remnants 60th Pz Gren Regt

" 156 Pz Gren Regt

116 Rcn Bn

1 SS Pz Div

CT Ring } largely destroyed

CT Schmidt) in pocket

506 Tank Bn

246 Inf Division

Remnants 689 Regt) largely destroy-

" 404 Regt) ed in pocket

246 Engr Bn

3rd Bn, 246 Regt TRIER

7 TD Bn (in support)

d. Artillery

Ninety-one (91) shellreps received at Corps FDG.

Thirty-eight (38) new enemy btry locations reported.

Twenty-three (23) suspected new enemy btry locations reported.

Our arty fired 124 counterbtry missions.

Enemy btry locations continue to be NE, E, and SE of Corps sector.

Fire was received during period from a single heavy caliber gun located to E of Corps sector.

e. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

The 29th Pz Gren Regt is available as an immediate reserve since it has not been identified in the line during the past two days.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

The enemy lacked aggressiveness up to 1500 hours today. At 1500 hours four tanks and fifty infantry moved to attack our positions on N edge of WURSEL. This attack was broken up by arty but the attacking force reformed and attacked a second time without success. At 1900 hours one hundred enemy infantry supported by two tanks rushed the position of "C" Co, 119th Inf Regt, vicinity of K840469. The attack was broken up by our forces without loss of ground.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Antiaircraft Artillery - Reports from First U.S. Army indicates that the enemy has considerable AA protection on all his supply routes and key installations between COLOGNE and the present XIX Corps front. The 2nd Armd Div reports that their air OPs have received an increased amount of AA fire during the past two days.

(2) Artillery - Enemy arty fire continues to be heavy with the bulk of the fires being of an harassing type. Some interdiction fire was reported during the period. The enemy has massed his fire more during this period with possible bn concentrations being reported.

(3) Aviation Combat - At 1840 and 1900 hours the enemy dropped anti-personnel bombs and HE bombs on our front lines. The 30th Div reported one white phosphorous bomb was dropped by the enemy during these attacks.

(4) Tanks - Tac/R reported 30 tanks parked at K930567 at 1230 hours. Ground observation reported 3 enemy tanks at K856645.

c. Miscellaneous

Immediately after dark tonight the 30th Inf Div and 2nd Armd Div reported movement of track vehicles at EUCHEN and HONGEN. Additional movement reported in IMMENDORF-SETTERICH area. This movement may be normal supply functions, a relief of units in the line, or a gathering of a force for an attack. Since the direction of movement and number of vehicles involved were not reported it is not possible to come to any definite conclusion.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather 212000A - 222000A Oct 44.

Scattered clouds tonight and early tomorrow morning with light fog in early morning and dissipating by mid-morning. Clouds become low broken in late morning and persisting all day tomorrow.

b. Prisoner who left DUREN F1145 in March 1944 states there are three artificial lakes in the ROER valley above DUREN. The first, according to the prisoner, located at F0635 has a capacity of ten million cubic meters and is surrounded by a concrete wall thought to be mined. Schamenauer Reservoir at F0926 which has a capacity of one hundred million cubic meters was built in conjunction with the West Wall and the dam is believed mined for flooding the ROER valley for defense. The reservoir called Urftallsperre at F0723 with a capacity of 60 million cubic meters not thought connected with flooding plan. No technical details of the flooding scheme were known to prisoner, but he said population of DUREN has been told to evacuate the town if an alarm consisting of ringing church-bells is heard, because the town would be flooded in depth of six meters. In checking air cover for confirmation of prisoner's statement, photos of 10th Sept 44 showed the following: The first reservoir was well over half empty. The reservoir at F0926 was obviously a hydro-electric power station with a massive dam and a capacity which could be great as that indicated by prisoner. No photo cover on the third reservoir was found.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change.

2 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report
Annex #2-First Gallup Poll of a German Town

- 2 -
S-E-C-R-E-T

George Graybill
Major GSC
for WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 192400 TO 202400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 140.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|---------------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| 116th Pz | 3 | 60th Pz Gren Regt 2nd Bn | 3 | 30th Div |
| 3rd Pz | 1 | 29th Pz Gren Regt 3rd Bn | 1 | 30th Div |
| 1st SS | 16 | Battle Group TIEFENTHAL | 1 | 30th Div |
| | | " " RING | 15 | " " |
| 245th Inf | 29 | 404th Regt Hq | 3 | 30th Div |
| | | 1st Bn | 13 | " " |
| | | 13th Co | 1 | " " |
| | | 14th Co | 2 | " " |
| | | 689th Regt Hq | 1 | " " |
| | | 2nd Bn | 1 | " " |
| | | 13th Co | 2 | " " |
| | | 14th Co | 2 | " " |
| | | 246th Arty Regt | 2 | " " |
| | | 246th Engr Bn | 2 | " " |
| 49th Inf | 1 | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 1 | 30th Div |
| 183rd Inf | 4 | 330th Regt 1st Bn | 3 | 2nd Armd Div |
| | | 343rd Regt 14th Co | 1 | " " " |
| ? | | 34th Fort MG Bn | 2 | 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | 1421 Marsch Bn | 33 | 30th Div & 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | Bn (Miss) | 37 | 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | Stragglers | 6 | 30th Div |
| | | | 1 | 2nd Armd Div |
| | | | 4 | 29th Div |
| | | | 3 | 1104th Engr Gp |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|------------------|-----|
| 29th Div | 4 |
| 30th Div | 64 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 5 |
| 1104th Engr C Gp | 67 |
| | 140 |

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 30,984.

Analysis of PWs Taken October 11 - 20

| | |
|---|--------|
| Total PWs taken by Corps units through 10 October: | 29,278 |
| Total PWs taken by Corps units October 11 - 20 incl.: | 1,706 |
| Total PWs taken by Corps units through 20 October: | 30,984 |

BREAKDOWN:

| | | | |
|---------------|----|-------------------|-----|
| 183rd Inf Div | 39 | 108th Pz Brig | 113 |
| 330th Regt | 8 | 2108th Pz Gren Bn | 113 |
| 343rd Regt | 7 | | |
| 351st Regt | 11 | | |
| Miss | 13 | | |

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| 246th Inf Div | 173 |
| 352nd Regt | 3 |
| 404th Regt | 65 |
| 680th Regt | 47 |
| Misc | 58 |

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| 49th Inf Div | 317 |
| 148th Regt | 5 |
| 149th Regt | 304 |
| Misc | 8 |

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| 116th Pz Div | 270 |
| 60th Pz Gren Regt | 104 |
| 156th Pz Gren Regt | 55 |
| 116th Pz Rcn Bn | 75 |
| Misc | 36 |

| | |
|----------------|----|
| 1st SS Div IAH | 51 |
| 1st SS Regt | 51 |

| | |
|--------------------|----|
| 2nd Pz Div | 10 |
| 304th Pz Gren Regt | 10 |

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 3rd Pz Gren Div | 3 |
| 29th Pz Gren Regt | 2 |
| Misc | 1 |

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 176th Inf Div | 7 |
| 167th Repl Bn | 3 |
| 22nd GAF Regt | 3 |
| 6th Obsn & Tng Bn | 1 |

Recapitulation:

| | |
|-----------------|------|
| 183rd Inf Div | 39 |
| 246th Inf Div | 173 |
| 49th Inf Div | 317 |
| 116th Pz Div | 270 |
| 1st SS Div IAH | 51 |
| 2nd Pz Div | 10 |
| 3rd Pz Gren Div | 3 |
| 176th Inf Div | 7 |
| 108th Pz Brig | 113 |
| | 983 |
| Misc Sep Units | 723 |
| Total Oct 11-20 | 1706 |

FIRST GALLUP POLL OF A GERMAN TOWN
HERZOGENRATH (K8553)

The following survey was made in HERZOGENRATH, a small mining town north of AACHEN. HERZOGENRATH was occupied by our troops on 8 October. Approximately 2,000 persons of the normal population of 8,000 remained in the town and surrounding area despite the Nazi order to evacuate.

1. SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

a. Ninety persons were interrogated. They included a group of officials newly appointed by our Military Government authorities, 13 members of the higher income group, a Catholic priest and nun, 14 small tradesmen and innkeepers, 12 farmers, and 48 miners and other workers. In general it was difficult to get factual answers for the people were overanxious to please the interrogator. Therefore, this poll should not be taken as a firm guide to occupied Germany.

2. ATTITUDE TOWARD AMERICAN OCCUPATION.

a. Eighty-one of the 90 persons interrogated welcomed American occupation. Nine were indifferent. All made it clear that they wanted to do everything the occupying power desired, and they would not undertake any action hostile to our forces. Typical of this attitude was the question from a member of the local Emergency Police who asked the interrogator what he should do about an American wire which had been wound around the doorknob of his house so that he could not use the door. When he was told to unwind it and put it on the ground he asked for written confirmation so that "Army authorities will not shoot me".

3. FEAR OF RETURN OF GERMANS.

a. Seventy-two persons interrogated were still afraid that the Germans might return. Should that happen they expect "the Germans will hang us all." 48 said that German troops had looted the town before evacuating.

4. ATTITUDE TOWARDS SS AND SA.

a. Every person interrogated spoke with bitterness about the SS and SA. The party troops, they said, had forced almost 6,000 persons to evacuate against their will. They were "fed up" with the Party and its actions and looked upon the Nazi uniforms as symbols of tyranny.

5. POSSIBILITY OF A NAZI UNDERGROUND.

a. There was practically unanimous opinion that the Nazis would be unable to revive their party in the HERZOGENRATH area. 35 persons interrogated said they would immediately denounce to the American authorities any Nazi plots or persons that would become known to them. 12 persons, including the Catholic priest, definitely believe that the SS and Hitler Youth have made preparations to go underground. They had no reason for their belief except that they felt the Nazis would somehow try to carry on.

6. ANTI-NAZI ORGANIZATIONS.

a. Eighty-seven said there was no such organization because it had been "verboten". Three mentioned the "Edelweisspiraten", as an anti-Nazi group. The "Edelweisspiraten" were not active in the HERZOGENRATH area, but according to the three persons mentioning the group, in Cologne.

7. POLITICAL SYMPATHIES.

a. Nineteen said they had been members of the Catholic Centre Party before the Nazis suppressed all parties except the NSDAP. Six said they had been Social Democrats. The remaining sixty-five had no political interest or

membership in any party. Among the miners there were no Communist sympathies. On the other hand the most Anti-Nazi persons among those interrogated were also anti-Communist. In general the whole cross section in this heavily Catholic community was anti-Communist as well as anti-Nazi. The Catholic Priest thought that Nazism was worse than Communism because the "Communists are frankly irreligious while the Nazis assume a mantle of piety."

8. HOPE OF GERMAN VICTORY.

a. Eighty-eight out of ninety persons interrogated believed Germany had lost the war, two thought there might be a stalemate behind the Rhine.

9. POSTWAR POLITICAL PLANS.

a. Forty-five had no plans and limited themselves to the hope for enough food and work, five wanted an independent Rhineland, seven wanted liberty from Prussia and Berlin without further specification, nine desired a democratic German Republic on the Weimar model, six were for a conservative Germany as before 1914, two wanted to be united to nearby Holland, five with relatives in the U.S.A. wanted to come to America, and eleven said they only worried about seeing the next day alive.

(Source: First U.S. Army G-2 Periodic Report #133)

② 10/23/44

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 23 Oct 44 *
* Init: 9/34 *

From: 220001A Oct 44
To : 222400A Oct 44

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 130

Maps: No change.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines
No change

b. Units in Contact

PWs from 8th Pz Gren Regt of 3rd Pz Gren Div state that Div CP of 3rd Pz Gren Div was located at KINZWEILER K939508 two days ago.

c. Artillery

Sixty-eight (68) shellreps received at the Corps FDC.

Twenty-nine (29) new enemy btry locations reported.

Twenty-three (23) suspected enemy btry locations reported.

Our arty fired seventy-one (71) counterbtry missions.

Active enemy btrys were located to NE, E and SE of the Corps zone. Excellent sound locations reported throughout the period indicate arty active in F0358 and F0353 grid squares.

d. Supply and Evacuation Establishments

PW information indicates that INDEN F029523 is the supply point for 3rd Pz Gren Div.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

a. General Summary

Enemy attitude throughout the period was purely defensive with the usual amount of arty and air activity being reported. The patrolling activity in area of 113th Cavalry was a little stronger than usual with 20-25 enemy troops raiding the line at HONGEN K731709.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Fire was moderate throughout the period. Light, medium and heavy caliber fire was reported falling largely in the vicinity of the forward elements. Fires were of an harassing nature. The area of 2nd Armd Div was shelled during the early morning hours and received sporadic shelling throughout the day. The 30th Div area received its greatest shelling during the afternoon. The 29th Div received light shelling throughout the day.

(2) Aviation Combat - At 1500 hours two ME109s were hedgehopping and strafing in the vicinity of K784584. At 1513 hours one FW 190 reported in vicinity of K767553 - no hostile action reported.

(3) Tanks - Two enemy tanks were reported in vicinity of WURSELEN during the afternoon. Three tanks were reported by 117th Inf Regt in vicinity K9052 at 1900 hours.

c. Miscellaneous

Enemy movement around HONGEN K928537 was reported at 2200 hours. Our arty started a few fires in the area by hitting enemy vehicles. We do not have sufficient information to indicate whether this is normal supply traffic or relief of troops in the area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather 222300A - 232300A Oct 44.

Broken middle and low clouds tonight becoming scattered in early morning.

Light fog in early morning lifting to form low overcast in midmorning. Low and middle broken clouds throughout the remainder of the day.

b. PWs from the 8th Pz Gren Regt refer to a 60th Div which relieved their unit at VERLAUTENHEIDE. The only div known by this number is 60th Pz Gren Div FELDHERNHALLE which, after returning from Russia in May 44, was used to form two Pz Brigades, 106th and 110th, and is no longer believed to exist as a div. 106th Pz Brig was largely destroyed by V Corps last month. 110th Pz Brigade has only been identified through a deserter who stated that the brigade was sent to Hungary. Yet another source reported the brigade enroute to the western front in mid-September. More recent information is not available.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. (1) The enemy is capable of defending on his present position with 3rd Pz Gren Div, 183rd Inf Div, 176th Div, and the Von Fritchen Regt supported by 10-12 bns of arty.

(2) The enemy is capable of attacking with the troops mentioned in a(1) supported by 10-12 bns of arty and possibly 30-50 tanks still believed to be on our front.

b. Discussion

Present actions and disposition of the enemy indicates that capability a(1) is in effect. The reported position areas of enemy arty, except for single roving guns, are well to the rear which is an indication of defense rather than attack.

2 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report
Annex #2-German Stay-Behind Pigeon Services

George F. Graybill
Major GSC
WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

Distribution:

Ninth US Army (5)
First US Army (1)
V Corps (2)
VII Corps (2)
XIII Corps (1)
2nd Armd Div
5th Armd Div
1st Inf Div
29th Inf Div
30th Inf Div
2nd Sig Bn
743rd Tank Bn
747th Tank Bn
2nd TD Gp (3)
12th AAA Gp
7th Armd Gp
258th FA Gp (4)

8th FA Bn
119th FA Gp (5)
228th FA Gp (5)
113th Cav Gp (4)
1104th Engr Gp (5)
1128th Engr Gp (2)
1115th Engr Gp (7)
1142nd Engr Gp (4)
67th Tactical Ren Gp
3252 Sig Serv Co
12th Army Gp
21st Army Gp
Det ZU, 21st MWG
16th AAA Gp
68th Med Gp
49th AAA Brig
32nd FA Brig

426th Med Bn
99th Inf Bn
6th Corps (British)
30th Corps (British)
CG XIX
C/S
G-1
G-3
G-4
War Room
Engr
Sig
Air O
Arty (2)
Combat Observers (6)
PI #20
MLI-#424

IPW #39
Mag Gen (2)
G-2 File (10)

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 202400 TO 212400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 210.

2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| 246th Inf | 82 | 352nd Regt 1st Bn | 1 | 30th Div |
| | | 2nd Bn | 49 | " " |
| | | 404th Regt 1st Bn | 14 | " " |
| | | 2nd Bn | 6 | " " |
| | | 246th Fusilier Co | 9 | " " |
| | | 246th Engr Bn | 3 | " " |
| 116th Pz | 10 | 60th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| | | 156th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 8 | " " |
| 3rd Pz Gren | 20 | 8th Pz Gren Regt 1st Bn | 7 | 30th Div |
| | | 2nd Bn | 9 | " " |
| | | 3rd Bn | 4 | " " |
| 1st SS | 7 | 1st SS (Battle Group Ring) | 5 | 30th Div |
| | | Supply | 1 | 1104th Engr Gp |
| | | 1st SS Sig Bn | 1 | " " " |
| 49th Inf | 12 | 149th Regt 1st Bn | 12 | 30th Div & 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | Inf Fortress Bn 1421 | 40 | 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | GAF Fortress Bn XIX | 12 | " " " |
| ? | | 217th Assault Tank Bn | 2 | 30th Div |
| ? | | 341 Assault Gun Brig | 5 | 30th Div & 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | 121 Assault Gun Brig | 1 | 1104th Engr Gp |
| ? | | Stragglers | 8 | 30th Div |
| | | | 3 | 29th Div |
| | | | 8 | 1104th Engr Gp |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|----------------|------------|
| 29th Div | 3 |
| 30th Div | 138 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 0 |
| 1104th Engr Gp | 69 |
| | <u>210</u> |

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 31,194.

GERMAN STAY-BEHIND PIGEON SERVICES

Reports have been received that the enemy is running an organized network of stay-behind pigeon services in Liberated countries, and captured agents have stated that pigeon agents are twice as numerous as W/T agents.

The lofts are of two kinds:

- (1) Small clandestine lofts from which birds would be dispatched with info to central lofts beyond our lines.
- (2) Central lofts where this info would be relayed by W/T and which could organize supplies of birds to agents. Central lofts are known to exist at COLOGNE, FLUSHING, BERG (in the island of TEXEL) and possibly at PARIS and BRUSSELS which may still be operating from underground.

Apart from their own birds the Germans have commandeered French, Belgian and Dutch pigeons. The German birds carry rings of the following types:

- (a) WBN1 plus a number (WBN1 standing for WEHRMACHT BRIEFTAUBE NIEDERLAND).
- (b) WBB1 plus a number (WBB1 standing for WEHRMACHT BRIEFTAUBE BELGIEN).

The majority of the German birds also carry on their rings the word WEHRMACHT or WEHRMACHT BRIEFTAUBE. The ring numbers of the commandeered birds would be of the following types:-

- | | | |
|-------------|----|--------|
| (a) FRANCE | 41 | 053917 |
| (b) BERG | 40 | 336810 |
| (c) HOLLAND | 42 | 342180 |

Units in the field should be warned of the German use of pigeons for espionage purposes. Apart from the agents the birds themselves are of value and should be seized, together with any message forms and message containers, and D. S. O. advised.

Should any pigeon agents be captured, this HQ should be informed immediately through the normal channels.

(Source: British 8th Corps, thru 7th Amd Div Periodic Report #64)

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
AFS 270

* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 24 Oct 44 *
* Init: *W.P.* *
* * * * *

232400 Oct 44

G-2 Estimate of the German Situation

I. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION

a. General

The XIX Corps has penetrated the Siegfried Line on a 11 mile front to a depth of 6 miles. Contact has been made with the 1st Infantry Division of VII Corps. AACHEN has fallen.

During this period the enemy has brought up all his local reserves. In addition the following units have been brought from other sectors and have been used in counterattacks:

Mobile Regt von Fritschen
108th Pz Brigade
116th Pz Division
1st SS Pz Div (1 bn)
2nd Pz Div (2 bns)
506th Tank Bn
3rd Pz Gren Div

All counterattacks have been driven off with loss to the enemy.

b. Frontage of elements of the XIX Corps are as follows from N to S.

| | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 113th Cav Gp plus attachments | 9-1/2 miles |
| 29th Inf Div plus attachments | 7-1/2 miles |
| 2nd Armd Div plus attachments | 7-1/2 miles |
| 30th Inf Div plus attachments | 6-1/4 miles |
| Total | approximately 31 miles |

c. Opposed to us in contact area:

176th Div (6 bns)
183rd Div (8 bns)
Mobile Regt von Fritschen (3 bns)
116th Pz Div (3 bns)
3rd Pz Gren Div (3 bns)
1st SS Div (1 bn)
2nd Pz Div (1 bn)
246th Inf Div (3 bns)
506th Tank Bn
7th TD Bn

d. Enemy Artillery

During the occupation of this area enemy artillery has been strengthened and believed organized to some degree to mass his fires with battalions. Concentrations of arty fire have been as high as 100 rounds of estimated 105mm. Majority of his fires have been harassing with some well-observed and well-placed interdiction fires. Enemy has employed, frequently, single guns of light, medium and heavy calibers. Damages resulting from enemy artillery fire has not been great. During periods of his most intense firing, ineffectiveness has been indicated. Counterbattery has not been employed, as such.

Calibers have ranged from single moving heavy RR guns to 210mm, 150mm, 105mm and 75mm.

Conservative estimate of artillery opposing the Corps would be approximately twelve to fourteen battalions with some indication of increase in the north.

e. Reserves

(1) Immediate Reserves

29th Pz Gren Regt of 3rd Pz Gren Div.
1 bn, 116th Pz Div.
3 bns, 183rd Inf Div.
1 bn, 176th Div.
50-100 tanks.

(2) Strategic Reserves

In addition to immediate reserves, available reserves capable of being brought against this Corps front within 3-4 days are:

9th Pz Div (Battlegroup)
9th SS Div (Battlegroup)
12th SS Div (Battlegroup)
Unidentified infantry division

f. Terrain and Prepared Defenses

GEILENKIRCHEN with its excellent road net exists as an enemy salient into our line.

In the north and central parts of our front the terrain is flat, sloping gently down to the ROER River. On the SE sector the country is rolling.

Except for the many towns and mining structures the country is relatively bare. CP's exist only in buildings and the tops of slag piles. The only woods occur N of GEILENKIRCHEN.

Rivers in our sector are the ROER, flowing into the MEUSE at ROERMOND; the EFT flowing into the RHINE near DUSSELDORF, and the RHINE itself.

The ROER River has recently been quite strongly fortified with much hasty digging.

In general the main emphasis has been put on anti-tank obstacles consisting of ditches approximately 12 to 14 feet wide and 4 to 6 feet deep. Other defensive measures consist of vast numbers of weapons pits and fox-holes, firing trenches and in some cases barbed wire entanglements and mines along the whole Corps sector. From WASSERBURG K894792 to DUREN FL18057 along the east bank of the ROER much community digging exists. This ties in with the general enemy defensive line more or less continuous from VENLO along the MEUSE to ROERMOND and thence along the ROER to DUREN.

2. CONCLUSIONS

a. Enemy Objectives

The enemy objectives on the Western Front may be taken as follows:

Ultimate Objective: To convince the Allies that Allied progress will be prohibitively slow and costly, thus obtaining a negotiated peace which will leave Germany and the Nazi Party intact.

Intermediate Objective: To protect Germany from further Allied invasion.

Immediate Objective: To hold the Allies substantially in their present position thereby GAINING TIME during which defenses may be constructed, troops and equipment brought up. Likewise as the season progresses, hours of darkness get longer, air and arty observation decreases, mud and cold get worse - all favoring the defender.

b. Enemy Capabilities

- (1) To defend in place.
- (2) To withdraw to the line of the ROER River, or farther back to the line of the RUFT or RHINE.
- (3) To make limited counterattacks principally as spoiling attacks in order to delay our preparations for a large offensive.
- (4) To make a large coordinated counterattack using all of his mobile reserves estimated at 3 battalions of infantry with 50-100 tanks to wipe out our penetration of the Siegfried Line.
- (5) In the case of our advance to counterattack preferably those parts of XIX Corps which have penetrated the line of the ROER River.

c. Discussion

A combination of defense in place with strictly limited spoiling counterattacks is indicated.

The enemy cannot afford to yield any German territory in this sector, so near to the industrial heart of Germany without a bitter struggle, hence a withdrawal is highly unlikely.

It is not likely that he will further expend his limited mobile reserves in an all out counterattack against our troops when they are relatively well protected in our present positions, and after very costly failures in recent counterattacks on our front.

In case of our advance the enemy would undoubtedly consider this sector the most important part of the Western Front and would send against us whatever reserves he could muster at that time.

Distribution:

Same as C-2 Periodic Report

Washington Platt
WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

③ 10/28/44

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270

* SECRET *
* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 28 Oct 44 *
* Init: *WKG* *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 270001A Oct 44
To : 272400A Oct 44

No. 135

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Lines

No change except that enemy right is at K673797 instead of MAREYCK as previously reported. This represents a correction of a former report and not a change in the line.

b. Units in Contact

There have been no new identifications. However, the 29th Div reports capturing PWs from the 254th Landesschutz Bn and 39th Fusilier Bn, the first from these units in some time.

There was less movement along the front and in the enemy rear during the period than during the last period. This may indicate that the suspected reorganization reported during last period of units along the front is being completed.

c. Defensive Organization

"He garrisons the pillboxes in the WURSELEN (K8748) area, and in the town itself utilizes buildings and covering infantry to shield 3 or 4 Mark VI tanks which completely command the main road. So far no weapons capable of destroying these tanks have been able to get at them. Along the rest of the front, his attitude has been entirely defensive, with his forward troops dug in behind the RR embarkment during the day, and disposed partially W of it at night. EUCHEN (K891507), MARIADORF (K913526) and its adjacent slag piles, and HONGEN (K928537) appear to be centers of enemy activity and may prove to be strongly defended points. There are indications of AT and AP mine laying along the front, and ample evidence of thorough and heavy prepared defensive artillery and mortar concentrations." (Source: 30th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Report No. 131)

d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

Immediate reserves: 116th Pz Div (4 bns); 1st SS Div (1 bn); 2nd Pz Div (1 bn); 3rd Pz Gren Div (1 bn); 183rd Div (2 bns); 176th Div (2 bns); 506th Tank Bn.

Available reserves: The British report an identification by PWs of the 6th Co and 7th Co of 10th Pz Gren Regt of the 9th Panzer Div in the vicinity of NEYJEL (17107). The two companies had been committed with a definite mission which removes at least a part of 9th Pz Div from the category of available reserves. Otherwise no change.

e. Artillery

One hundred and twenty-five (125) shellreps were received during the period. These represent a total of 1575 enemy rounds fired.

Four (4) new btry locations reported.

Twenty-two (22) suspected btry locations were reported.

Our arty fired ninety-one (91) counterbtry missions during the period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

a. General Summary

The appearance of four tanks in the WURSELEN area (K8748), an increase of

artillery against the 30th Div and light partolling against the 2nd Armd Div, together with some air action against our front lines made up the only aggressive action during the period.

Movement opposite the 30th Div was on a reduced scale as compared to the last period. The 2nd Armd Div reported some movement between SIERSDORF (K935567), and SCHLEIDEN (K948552).

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Enemy artillery was moderately heavy during the period. There was at least one period of intensive shelling against the 30th Div. There was a general increase against 30th Div over the last period with the greatest increase during the afternoon. Concentrations ranged from a few rounds to 20 rounds. Light, medium and a very few heavy calibers were laid on over forward elements, especially the 30th Div.

There was a decided increase in mortar fire against elements of the 30th Div.

(2) Air - Four to six ME-109s and four FW-190s appeared over the area. Individual planes strafed along the entire front. At least one bomb was dropped in the 30th Div area.

(3) Armor - Four tracked vehicles, reported to be tanks, appeared on the front of the 30th Div in the WURSELEN area. They fired a few rounds into buildings, were taken under fire by artillery and have not been noted since.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Weather

Weather today: Low overcast with much haze, visibility greatly restricted. Forecast for coming period: Overcast with light rain and drizzle tonight. Clouds breaking during early morning and becoming broken with occasional overcast and showers for balance of period. Visibility good tomorrow except only fair during showers.

b. Estimated Enemy Killed During Period - 105.

5 Incls.

- Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report
- Annex #2-PWI Report
- Annex #3-The Germans Look Us Over
- Annex #4-Review of the Enemy Situation in the West
- Annex #5-Sun and Moon Data

Hyndham K. Platt
for WASHINGTON PLATT Lt Col
Colonel, GSC GSC
G-2

Distribution:

| | | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| Ninth US Army (5) | 8th FA Bn | 426th Med Bn | IPW #39 |
| First US Army | 119th FA Gp (5) | 99th Inf Bn | Msg Cen (2) |
| V Corps (2) | 228th FA Gp (5) | 8th Corps (British) | G-2 Air, Ninth |
| VII Corps (2) | 113th Cav Gp (4) | 30th Corps (British) | US Army |
| XIII Corps | 1104th Engr Gp (5) | CG XIX | G-2 File (10) |
| 2nd Armd Div | 1128th Engr Gp (2) | C/S | |
| 5th Armd Div | 1115th Engr Gp (7) | G-1 | |
| 1st Inf Div | 1142nd Engr Gp (4) | G-3 | |
| 29th Inf Div | 3252 Sig Serv Co | G-4 | |
| 30th Inf Div | 12th Army Gp | War Room | |
| 2nd Sig Bn | 21st Army Gp | Engr | |
| 743rd Tank Bn | Det ZU, 21st MWU | Sig | |
| 747th Tank Bn | 16th AAA Gp | Air O | |
| 2nd TD Gp (3) | 68th Med Gp | Arty (2) | |
| 12th AAA Gp | 19th AAA Brig | Combat Observers (6) | |
| 7th Armd Gp | 32nd FA Brig | PI #20 | |
| 258th FA Gp (5) | 79th FA Group | MLI #424 | |

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 252400 TO 262400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 16.

2. All 16 of these PWs were reported from cage of 30th Div, and were stragglers from German units not on the Western Front; without exception they were on furlough in order to help evacuate their families from the path of the Allied advance.

3. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 31,413.

IPW TEAM #39

PWI REPORT

A brief study of 27 PWs from

Unit : KG Tiefenthal

Captured : In AACHEN

Preamble : With the exception of some older NCOs the average age of PWs was 19; average height 6 feet. All veterans with at least one year of combat duty.

General Information:

PWs can be classified into 3 groups

1. as volunteers
2. forced into the SS from the Luftwaffe or the Army
3. drafted into the SS from the Arbeitsdienst

Group 1:

These PWs whether interrogated individually or collectively, NCO's and EM alike, were all convinced and fanatical Nazis beyond reasoning. They were proud and arrogant and there was no doubt in their minds that Germany is going to win the war. Though they were continuously in battle since their first commitment at CAEN and were now fighting a losing battle in AACHEN they have not uttered a word of complaint and thought that their CO Obersturmfuehrer RINK was an ideal leader. PWs had another thing in common: in their religion column in the Soldbuch their original religious affiliations were scratched out and had the mark g.gl. (gott glaeubig). They disclaimed that this was forced upon them; they insist that they changed religion as a result of their convictions.

Group 2:

PWs in this group caused the low height average. They were all under 6 feet and were looked down upon by the regular SS in more than one way. They came to the IAH in Apr 43 in BERGEN, Germany. About 5000 former Luftwaffe ground personnel were in training there and were to become members of a Luftwaffe Feld Div, but at that time the IAH was practically destroyed at CHARKOV and consequently all 5000 men were transferred to the SS. PWs were bitter against the SS and their leaders. They thought that Obersturmfuehrer RINK was a coward and brute who did not have any regard for human life. They resented the pressure on the part of their officers in trying to make them give up their religion. PWs were glad to be in American hands, but still believed in the justness of the German cause.

Group 3:

PWs were selected for the SS from the Arbeitsdienst; they are all young and tall (well over 6 feet). They had no choice in the matter. Some of them have become convinced Nazis and in many respects resemble the PWs described in Group 1; they too changed their religion to g.gl. Others again were not so enthusiastic, not too happy to be in the SS. Some of them even claim to have deserted.

Other Information:

When the PWs in Group 1 were searched by lower echelons and stood up against the wall, they were sure that they were going to be shot. (Their officers told them that Americans shoot all SS PWs.)

Summary

It is impossible to reason with or convince a young fanatical Nazi; the better he is treated the more arrogant he gets. They have no place in postwar Germany and should be detained in Labor Bns for years after the war.

(Source: First Army PWI Report 26 Oct 44).

THE GERMANS LOOK US OVER

The following is reproduced verbatim:

The following extracts are taken from a report which the CO of 1st Bn., Gren Regt 1120 (553rd Div) made to the Regt CO per order of the Divisional Commander to all of his subordinate units.

I/Gren Regt 1120

Btl CP Oct 5, 1944

Report on Experience Collected in Combat by Capt HOPPE, CO, I Bn

1. Enemy Infantry

During the last week of operation the American Infantry hasn't shown aggressive infantry action. When possible, he avoids close combat, when attacking they mass behind tanks or sit on the tanks. They very seldom take advantage of darkness or fog to begin an attack. It is usually preceded by a strong artillery preparation with the employment of all calibers including their heaviest ones. Planes are used for their fire direction and excellent results have been obtained. The infantry shoots wildly into the neighborhood or at principal sectors; most of the fire is unaimed.

2. Enemy Artillery

Artillery directed by observation planes has fire placed on each movement. The infantry main effort is usually supported by good fire concentration and employment of tanks. German counterattack is harassed by American fighter bombers which strafe and bomb the German infantry.

Fire concentrations on road crossings and identified positions are always placed at irregular intervals.

3. Enemy Tanks

If one of their tanks is hit by our AT weapons, the other tanks immediately turn away. On a break through to our positions they shoot our troops in fox holes with automatic rifles and MG fire; it is therefore recommended to dig our fox holes at a right angle underground. In attacking tanks at close range the large rifle grenade and bazooka have proved to be valuable weapons. The small rifle grenade was found to be ineffective and unable to penetrate the tanks.

With our own attacks, we found them to be more successful when they were launched without artillery preparation so as to have the surprise element in our favor; also the use of darkness and fog has been found to be to our advantage.

If artillery support is used, it is best to camouflage the concentration of the sector of our attack by covering simultaneously the other sectors with fire.

4. German Tactics. Attack preparation and Attack.

When possible any attack preparation are to be avoided during day time. The enemy air observation detects every movement and directs sudden and heavy fire concentrations on the deployment area.

In order to avoid losses the jump off position is to be manned by infiltration. Attack in depth cuts down our own losses and allows us a flexible employment of our troops.

When our troops are caught by the enemy's artillery fire, it has been found very hard to escape by trying to go around it; therefore, it is recommended to take cover immediately. When this happens the troops have to work their way close enough to be inside the minimum range of artillery and mortars. It often proved to be beneficial to attach medium mortars to the assaulting units.

It is also suitable to follow up the main effort with an observation post, in order to direct the fire from the captured positions.

In reference to the lack of cooperation with the artillery, it must be emphasized again and again, every one must help the infantry man.

At the main effort double communication must be safeguarded by telephone and radio.

5. Defense.

(a) Principle: Deployment in depth in the sector. Always have a reserve available even though only a small force.

(b) Establishment of three (3) CPs simultaneously.

1. Establishment of an OP in the MLR.

2. Establishment of OP (main OP) in advanced sector of Resistance.

3. Establishment of OP in immediate vicinity of gun position.

During the past engagements the installation of three (3) OPs proved to be very valuable because the enemy was always under observation and fire even though a penetration had been made.

(c) Attachment of medium mortars (8 cm). Only one (1) mortar is to be attached to the attacking company.

The readiness and quick change of position makes this a valuable weapon.

The rest of the weapons should be under control of mortar platoon leader for concentrated use on any one sector.

6. Tank Destroyers.

The practice of assigning the TDs in section strength to the infantry units proved to be right. (Comment: by XII Corps) The practice mentioned is believed to be the same as the assault gun tactics, namely 3 or 5 guns in one sector so as to support each other from all angles. In this way, they could also be used as direct fire on any target within range.

(Source: XX Corps Periodic Report No. 76, through Hq VII Corps Periodic Report #143.

REVIEW OF THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE WEST

1. The enemy continued on the defensive during the week ended 21 October, along the entire Western Front from BRESKENS to the SWISS border. Counterattacks on an important scale were mounted only in the AACHEN area. These counterattacks made primarily by elements of the 3 Panzer Grenadier Division proved ineffective and wasteful. No new divisions are known to have come to the Western Front during the past two weeks which probably is explained by the comparatively stable situation in the West in contrast to the strong pressure of the Russians in the East. There is some evidence of enemy concern over the breach of the West Wall at AACHEN in the apparent movement Northward of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division whose present location and precise destination are not yet established. There is also further evidence of withdrawal of panzer divisions from the line for rest and refitting and of enemy intentions to build up a strategic reserve of armored forces in the general area of MUENSTER and PADERBORN.

2. The enemy's effort to build up a strong panzer force as a strategic reserve is indicative of the use the enemy makes of the time granted him by inevitable Allied delay. With the exception of the penetration at AACHEN, the enemy holds the West Wall virtually intact. He has manned it largely with infantry and fortress troops and he has had an opportunity to improve and deepen its defenses. In the threatened sector between AACHEN and COLOGNE there is a surprising density of newly-erected defense works including fire trenches, barbed wire and anti-tank ditches to the East of the ROER River. Similar defense works are also appearing East of the ERFT. As a part of this defense system the enemy is capable of flooding the valley of the ROER by the release of more than 100,000,000 cubic meters of impounded water.

3. The enemy has so far been able to seal off or, at least, to prevent exploitation of each Allied penetration of the West Wall by switching armor from one sector to another. He is now apparently endeavoring to build up an armored reserve and given sufficient time, say until 1 December, he could probably scrape together a powerful striking force of panzer divisions. This force would be employed, presumably, in the Northern sectors of the Western Front where Allied break-throughs would be most dangerous to the enemy both because of terrain advantages to Allied mobility and the proximity of vital industrial areas in GERMANY. Such a reserve of armor might enable the enemy to achieve his major objective of stalling the Allied advance for the winter at the West Wall or the RHINE.

4. Time is the vital factor in German planning. In building up an armored reserve the enemy may be hampered by various shortages and the shortage of oil may restrict its full employment. However, the greatest danger to the enemy's program lies in the threat of a major Allied attack in the West and in the actuality of the Russian advances. A serious break-through in the West would undoubtedly force the commitment of the enemy's reserve divisions with whatever equipment they have at the time. Similarly, a Russian sweep through BUDAPEST toward VIENNA or an advance westward between WARSAW and the BALTIC might force the Germans to rush, at least, a part of these reserves to the Eastern front. The enemy is thus threatened both in the East and the West with a premature drain on the armored reserve upon which he must rest his main hope of averting defeat this year.

(Source: Twelfth Army Group, through Hq First U.S. Army Periodic Report #138)

SUN AND MOON DATA

BRITISH "A" TIME

OCTOBER

| | Morning Twilight | Sunrise | Sunset | Evening Twilight |
|----|---------------------|---------|--------|---------------------|
| 25 | 250643 | 250716 | 251724 | 251759 |
| 26 | 260643 | 260717 | 261722 | 261758 |
| 27 | 270644 | 270719 | 271720 | 271756 |
| 28 | 280646 | 280720 | 281719 | 281754 |
| 29 | 290648 | 290722 | 291717 | 291752 |
| 30 | 300650 | 300724 | 301715 | 301750 |
| 31 | 310652 | 310725 | 311713 | 311749 |

NOVEMBER

| | | | | |
|----|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | 010653 | 010727 | 011711 | 011747 |
| 2 | 020655 | 020729 | 021709 | 021745 |
| 3 | 030656 | 030731 | 031707 | 031744 |
| 4 | 040658 | 040733 | 041706 | 041742 |
| 5 | 050700 | 050735 | 051704 | 051740 |
| 6 | 060701 | 060736 | 061702 | 061739 |
| 7 | 070702 | 070738 | 071701 | 071738 |
| 8 | 080704 | 080740 | 081659 | 081736 |
| 9 | 090706 | 090741 | 091658 | 091735 |
| 10 | 100707 | 100743 | 101656 | 101734 |
| 11 | 110708 | 110745 | 111655 | 111732 |
| 12 | 120710 | 120746 | 121653 | 121730 |
| 13 | 130712 | 130748 | 131652 | 131729 |
| 14 | 140714 | 140750 | 141651 | 141728 |
| 15 | 150715 | 150751 | 151649 | 151727 |
| 16 | 160717 | 160753 | 161648 | 161725 |
| 17 | 170718 | 170755 | 171647 | 171724 |
| 18 | 180719 | 180757 | 181645 | 181723 |
| 19 | 190721 | 190759 | 191644 | 191721 |
| 20 | 200722 | 200800 | 201643 | 201720 |
| 21 | 210724 | 210802 | 211642 | 211719 |
| 22 | 220726 | 220803 | 221641 | 221718 |
| 23 | 230727 | 230805 | 231640 | 231718 |
| 24 | 240728 | 240806 | 241639 | 241717 |
| 25 | 250730 | 250808 | 251637 | 251716 |
| 26 | 260731 | 260809 | 261637 | 261716 |
| 27 | 270732 | 270811 | 271636 | 271715 |
| 28 | 280734 | 280812 | 281635 | 281714 |
| 29 | 290736 | 290814 | 291635 | 291714 |
| 30 | 300737 | 300815 | 301634 | 301713 |

MOON DATA

OCTOBER

| | Rise | Set | Phase |
|----|--------|--------|----------|
| 25 | 251500 | 252353 | 1st qtr. |
| 26 | 261535 | 270112 | |
| 27 | 271604 | 280235 | |
| 28 | 281629 | 290400 | |
| 29 | 291653 | 300525 | |
| 30 | 301716 | 310650 | |
| 31 | 311741 | 010815 | Full |

MOON DATA (cont'd)

NOVEMBER

| | Rise | Set | Phase |
|----|--------|--------|-----------|
| 1 | 011809 | 020937 | |
| 2 | 021852 | 031053 | |
| 3 | 031923 | 041200 | |
| 4 | 042011 | 051256 | |
| 5 | 052117 | 061340 | |
| 6 | 062219 | 071415 | |
| 7 | 072314 | 081444 | 3rd Qrtr. |
| 8 | ////// | ////// | |
| 9 | 090020 | 091507 | |
| 10 | 100126 | 101517 | |
| 11 | 110231 | 111545 | |
| 12 | 120347 | 121603 | |
| 13 | 130443 | 131620 | |
| 14 | 140550 | 141639 | |
| 15 | 150659 | 151701 | New Moon |
| 16 | 160808 | 161727 | |
| 17 | 170918 | 171759 | |
| 18 | 181025 | 181847 | |
| 19 | 191126 | 191929 | |
| 20 | 201219 | 202031 | |
| 21 | 211303 | 212139 | |
| 22 | 221338 | 222357 | |
| 23 | 231408 | 240017 | 1st Qrtr. |
| 24 | 241433 | 250138 | |
| 25 | 251456 | 260300 | |
| 26 | 261518 | 270422 | |
| 27 | 271541 | 280545 | |
| 28 | 281606 | 290707 | |
| 29 | 291636 | 300827 | |
| 30 | 301712 | 010940 | |

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of G-2
APO 270* Auth: G-2 XIX Corps *
* Date: 30 Oct 44 *
* Init: A78 *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 290001A Oct 44
To : 292400A Oct 44

No. 137

Maps: No change

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Line

No change.

b. Defensive Organization

Civilian report (reliability unknown), approximately 100 men are dug in close to RR track from K921536 to K923539. Mines at crossroad K922542. AT gun at K925535.

c. Artillery

Seventy-seven (77) shellraps received at Corps FDC.
Twenty-three (23) new enemy battery locations reported.
Twenty-nine (29) suspected enemy battery locations reported.
Our arty fired fifty-one (51) counterbattery missions.
Sound locations and photo cover indicated probable heavy caliber gun at F06305123.

Active enemy batteries NE, E and to lesser degree SE of Corps sector.
Light, medium and heavy caliber fire reported.

d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention

PW and civilian information indicates that there are large troop concentrations at STETTER ICH F065592, STEINSTRASS F121599 and ELSDORF F180605. It is fairly certain that 116 Pz Div is in STEINSTRASS. No information has been received identifying any other troops in this area.

Reports from 12th Army Group P.R. No. 143 furnish the following information regarding movement of troops from NORWAY:

"(1) An excellent source in DENMARK reports that from 18-20 October, two ships per day (totalling approximately 45,000 tons) arrived at AARHUS, DENMARK.

(2) This source adds that Infantry General BODENSTEDT and Oberst OERTELS (presumably divisional staff), an infantry battalion "commandant presumably Major BOESCHMANN", and an artillery battalion departed on 18 October in three unit trains to GERMANY. More convoys are expected.

(3) A source of unknown reliability states that three divisions are moving from South NORWAY, one of them from BERGEN. The Germans have ordered rail transport for a period of ten days. (SHAEF Comment: 269 Inf Div was in the BERGEN sector, and FPNs of the units carried on some of the ships identify parts at least of 469 and 489 Gr Regts of this division. The total tonnage of 45,000 should have been able to carry the whole division. No BODENSTEDT is known but a BODENSTEDT (Genlt in 1942) is a possibility and his present command is unknown. No OERTELS or BOESCHMANN known.) Comment: 196 Inf Div has also been reported moving South from NORWAY."

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

The enemy continued to improve his defensive positions in close to our line and also on the high ground on both sides of ROER River between LINNICH K970655 and JULICH F035590. Usual amount of artillery and patrol activity was also reported during the period.

b. Operations of Component Elements

(1) Artillery - Moderate throughout the period with the 29th Inf Div and 2nd Arm Div receiving the bulk of the shelling.

(2) Aviation Combat - 1415 and 1435 hours - three FW 190s and one ME 109 flew over area. No hostile acts committed.

At 1840 hours, one JU 88 dropped several flares over front.

At 1905 hours, two unidentified aircraft flying E to W at 4000 feet dropped one bomb vicinity K8557.

c. Miscellaneous

Air OPs report that the enemy is moving his trains practically within sight of our front lines. At 0953 hours a train was reported moving S at K976646. Later in the afternoon a train with 10 passenger cars was reported moving N at F08646969 and a locomotive was moving E at K97007130.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated Enemy Killed During Period - 75.

b. Weather 291700A to 301700A Oct 44.

Scattered clouds this evening persisting tonight and in early morning. Clouds becoming low overcast before dawn and breaking by mid-morning. Clouds becoming broken in afternoon.

c. Extract Enemy Capabilities, British 30th Corps IS #530.

.....The general picture remains unchanged - unbroken determination to hold the line of the WEST WALL (despite the loss of AACHEN) and the VOSGES; and to deny base ports to the Allies, assiduous efforts to build up a reserve of panzer and parachute troops by November, lack of hope of reinforcements before November and of anything really substantial even then. Meantime, to fight back wherever the Allies strike, and reinforce wherever they strike in force, with a growing conviction that the really critical sector is in the NORTH opposite the RUHR.

.....It is plain, finally, that it is only with the greatest of difficulty that current thrusts are being contained, and that fresh divisions and fortress units are being burned up at an exorbitant rate in the process. Whether the enemy's advantages in terrain and come and temporary attession of fighting spirit due to fighting on GERMAN soil, now tempered by the sight of its effects at AACHEN, will really continue to tilt the balance very much longer, is problematical.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change.

2 Incls.

Annex #1-Consolidated Corps PW Report

Annex #2-Miscellaneous

George F. Braghill
Major GSC
WASHINGTON PLATT
Colonel, GSC
G-2

Distribution:

Same as Periodic Report #136

CONSOLIDATED CORPS PW REPORT FROM 272400 TO 282400

1. Total PWs reported from cages of Corps units for the period: 19.
2. Breakdown of PWs according to units of origin follows:

| Div | No. of PWs | Regiment or Separate Unit | No. of PWs | Capturing Unit |
|-----------|------------|--|------------|----------------------------|
| 183rd Div | 3 | 343rd Regt 2nd Bn NCO School DUEREN | 1 | 2nd Armd Div |
| | | | 2 | 29th Div |
| 246th Div | 1 | 246th Arty Regt | 1 | 30th Div |
| 176th Div | 7 | 306th Repl & Tng Bn | 6 | 29th Div & 113th Cav Gp |
| | | 39th " " " " | 1 | 113th Cav Gp |
| ? | | Stragglers | 8 | 30th Div |

3. Breakdown of PWs according to capturing units follows:

| | |
|--------------|-----------|
| 29th Div | 6 |
| 30th Div | 9 |
| 2nd Armd Div | 1 |
| 113th Cav Gp | 3 |
| | <u>19</u> |

The three PWs reported from 113th Cav Gp were cleared through the cage of the 29th Div.

4. Total PWs taken by Corps units to date: 31,443.

Report of Interrogation at Corps PWE

Name: RAUSCH, Heinrich, Obergefreiter

Unit: 2nd Co, 39th Repl & Tng Bn, 176th Div

Time and Place of Capture: 280730 October 1944, at NIEUWSTAD (685725) by 125th Cav Sqn.

PREAMBLE: At the time of his induction into the army, PW was a student, and had the equivalent of 1½ years of American college. He is a native of COLOGNE, and is now 23 years of age. During his four years in the German Army, PW has been for the most part on the Russian front, returning to the West after having been severely wounded during the past year.

PW's Bn was first committed 5 September via HASSELT. On 29 September, after a particularly heavy American attack, PW became separated from his unit and made his way to COLOGNE. After a short time there, he was sent to a Repl Bn in DUISBURG, where he remained until 17 October, at which time he returned to COLOGNE. Leaving there on or about 22 October, he returned to the 39th Repl Bn.

INFORMATION: COLOGNE. PW estimated that approximately 80% of the buildings in the city have been destroyed or severely damaged. Raids since the beginning of 1944 have completed the destruction begun by the original Rhineland raids in 1942 and 1943. PW believes that there are still between 300,000 and 400,000 civilians in the city, as well as a very large number of foreign workers, chiefly Italian, Russian and French, and large number of service troops.

Civilians were ordered to evacuate the city some time ago. At present, the policy is to provide transportation out of the city for women and

children, but all males between the ages of 16 and 60, or who otherwise look physically able to work or become members of the "Volksturm", must stay. According to PW, very few people are leaving, and at present the population is either living in the cellars of destroyed buildings or are occupying temporary wooden shelters on the outskirts of the city.

At the time the PW was last in the city (17 - 22 October) there was a great deal of activity in and about Nazi Party buildings, where all records were either being burned or carted off with the rest of the furniture and office gear to the far side of the Rhine. There are few of the higher Party officials still resident in the city, although lesser leaders have remained behind to organize the new "Volksturm" units and to supervise the procurement of labor for the "community digging".

PW was questioned to check reports received from air obsn about small arms firing at night in the city. He stated that he had heard a number of sustained bursts of fire while there, and had been told by civilians that a number of attacks had been made on Party officials by civilians with weapons procured from returning troops. The report of lights being on at night in COLOGNE was also discussed, and PW stated that the lights had been in the marshalling yards only, since the street-lighting system has been completely destroyed and there has not been any reason to bother to repair it. The lights in the marshalling yards were left on, according to the PW, in order to expedite train movements and are frequently not extinguished during air raids because the RR employees did not hear the faulty and ineffective air raid warning system, which now consists simply of the firing of four rounds of flak.

The MUELHEIM Bridge across the Rhine has been completely destroyed; a stray bomb set off the demolition charges already in place. The other main bridge, the HOHENZOLLERN, is still intact, but the demolition charges have been removed.

PW made specific reference to the air raids of 8th and 9th of October. At that time, all traffic was seriously held up by the large bomb craters in the streets and on the roads, with a consequent jamming of convoys.

"Volksturm" units now being formed in the COLOGNE area have not as yet been armed and will not be, until the Allied threat to COLOGNE becomes more immediate. At present, the personnel in these units are engaged in digging operations, and Party leaders will not issue arms for fear of their own safety. Among army troops there is considerable feeling against the formation of the "Volksturm," since, being led by Party officials, it will be tantamount to a second SS and constitute a potential weapon against the army.

Among the elements still somewhat loyal to the Party, there are strong rumors of another army in reserve across the Rhine, composed of both SS and "Volksgrnadier" divisions. This is to counter the two-pronged attack which will ostensibly be made by the Americans advancing to COLOGNE and then swinging North, and the British advancing from NIJMEGEN to the RUHR and then turning South. However, even these loyal elements state that this army will play a purely defensive role.

In commenting upon the general feeling among the civilians in COLOGNE, PW stated that those who have remained behind up to this late date will more than likely continue to stay until the Americans arrive, and will be more than satisfied to be under military control, and have peace at any price.

OUTSIDE COLOGNE. The RR as far as ERKLENZ is still intact, and regular runs are still being made to that point from COLOGNE and DUESSELDORF. However, in view of the continued raids and strafing, trains are usually hours late, and the army relies to a great extent instead upon trucks for their system of transportation.

In travelling along the roads in this area, PW observed that most of the digging going on was in the preparation of foxholes, approximately 5-1/2 feet deep by 2 feet wide by 3 feet long, dug in such a manner that they give protection against tanks, and are well camouflaged. These were placed not far from the roadway, four or five to the kilometer. Holes dug by civilians were uniformly poor, but those dug by Russians and other PW labor were usually very well prepared and extremely well camouflaged.

To keep up this digging at full speed, it has been found necessary to recruit labor forcibly, particularly in those parts of Holland still occupied. Party leaders have approached military commanders to provide guards for this recruiting and much bad feeling against the Party has resulted. PW mentioned the forced removal of all men from POSTERHOLD (near ROERMOND) recently, as an example.

IPW TEAM #39, HQ XIX CORPS

Annex #2 to
Periodic Report #137

MISCELLANEOUS

Desertion

A deserter who recently surrendered in the NIJMEGEN sector had a very interesting story:

On 23 Jan 44 he received a three-week furlough from RUSSIA. He went home and decided not to return. Through a friend, ANTON JOEKEN, in LEUTH, he contacted a Dr. SCHEFFERS in MILLINGEN. This doctor is a Dutch citizen and had been imprisoned as a hostage by the Germans for some time. PW had his leg broken by the doctor. He told German authorities that it happened when he fell from a horse. PW was admitted to the hospital in KLEVE on 20 Feb and stayed there until Sep. Early in Sep, the hospital was moved to RHEINE in WESTPHALIA. PW was released from hospital on 29 Sep and was granted a furlough until 9 Oct.

PW hoped that Allied tps would adv and liberate his home. When 8 Oct came and he saw that his hope was in vain, he sent his father to KLEVE. His family knew a Capt SCHWARZ, senior offr of the post, fairly well. Capt SCHWARZ, used to be a teacher in civilian life and had taught some of the members of the family in school. Capt SCHWARZ extended PW's furlough several times for a few days. The family paid back by sending several food packages from their farm.

On 23 Oct, the furlough had expired again. The father went to KLEVE only to find out that Capt SCHWARZ had been transferred. The offr who had taken his place refused to extend the furlough any more. PW immediately decided to desert. He knew a man who lived in MILLINGEN right on the bank of the R. WAAL. This friend prepared a raft and last night PW let himself float down. He was told that he would meet Allied tps at the 6th brick factory and that is where he landed. After being interrogated, PW requested a special favour: he asked our arty to fire one shell in the direction of his home. This was the signal he had arranged with his family to let them know that he was safe.

(Source: Second Army I.S. No. 145 through 8th Corps Intelligence Summary No. 98)

Miscellaneous

Extract from Enemy Order

Subject: Traffic Discipline.

On 30 Sep a staff car of the Wehrmacht cut a corner at HAARLEM contrary to regulations and in so doing forced a cyclist, who was riding on his proper side, on the pavement. In reply to the cyclist's expression of annoyance the offr riding in the car threw a hand grenade at him, causing serious injury to a 13 year old girl and a 35 year old man, both of whom had absolutely nothing to do with the matter.

It must be demanded of offr and men that they comply with the traffic regulations. It is not permissible that owing to faulty behaviour on our part the civilian population be unnecessarily provoked by such thoughtless actions and as in the present instance placed apparently in the right as regards the consequence of such actions. The action of the offr cannot be justified in any way and is to be deprecated.

(Source: Second Army I.S. No. 145 through 8th Corps Intelligence Summary No. 98).